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[pkgsrc/trunk]: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45 Apply security patch from XSA-182...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/pkgsrc/rev/5f5a4027adc2
branches: trunk
changeset: 350378:5f5a4027adc2
user: bouyer <bouyer%pkgsrc.org@localhost>
date: Tue Jul 26 14:31:56 2016 +0000
description:
Apply security patch from XSA-182 and XSA-183. Bump PKGREVISION
diffstat:
sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile | 4 +-
sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo | 4 +-
sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182 | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183 | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diffs (222 lines):
diff -r 78168b9e49e1 -r 5f5a4027adc2 sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile Tue Jul 26 14:17:08 2016 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile Tue Jul 26 14:31:56 2016 +0000
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.18 2016/07/09 13:04:08 wiz Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.19 2016/07/26 14:31:56 bouyer Exp $
VERSION= 4.5.3
DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION}
PKGNAME= xenkernel45-${VERSION}
-#PKGREVISION= 0
+PKGREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= sysutils
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/
diff -r 78168b9e49e1 -r 5f5a4027adc2 sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo Tue Jul 26 14:17:08 2016 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo Tue Jul 26 14:31:56 2016 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.14 2016/05/12 15:42:58 bouyer Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.15 2016/07/26 14:31:56 bouyer Exp $
SHA1 (xen-4.5.3.tar.gz) = 95d56c42642adcffe55dcf82a021d49115373108
RMD160 (xen-4.5.3.tar.gz) = 7ba586b20404e95308007663e87868c0ccc0e6f4
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = a2a104d023cea4e551a3ad40927d4884d6c610bf
SHA1 (patch-XSA-172) = ff4560534381d4d4c553170fbeb674f9361d9740
SHA1 (patch-XSA-173) = 0f6a2c4d9467713f3d969020f8fba62aa2f5297b
+SHA1 (patch-XSA-182) = 77dfd369df89a51355318e26e38837482f09996e
+SHA1 (patch-XSA-183) = f2a6027ff71c32c16abeb1b17e3226b714a5f1f4
SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = 750d0c8d4fea14d3ef3f872de5242a1f5104cbbe
SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = 7b0894ba7311edb02118a021671f304cf3872154
SHA1 (patch-xen_common_page__alloc.c) = c4d606de1cada8cf89b5abd16efada3d58c68a03
diff -r 78168b9e49e1 -r 5f5a4027adc2 sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182 Tue Jul 26 14:31:56 2016 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA-182,v 1.1 2016/07/26 14:31:57 bouyer Exp $
+
+From 798c1498f764bfaa7b0b955bab40b01b0610d372 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 14:32:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pv: Remove unsafe bits from the mod_l?_entry() fastpath
+
+All changes in writeability and cacheability must go through full
+re-validation.
+
+Rework the logic as a whitelist, to make it clearer to follow.
+
+This is XSA-182
+
+Reported-by: Jérémie Boutoille <jboutoille%ext.quarkslab.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim%xen.org@localhost>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
+ xen/include/asm-x86/page.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+index b4c4fa4..a68a1ab 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -1695,6 +1695,14 @@ static inline int update_intpte(intpte_t *p,
+ _t ## e_get_intpte(_o), _t ## e_get_intpte(_n), \
+ (_m), (_v), (_ad))
+
++/*
++ * PTE flags that a guest may change without re-validating the PTE.
++ * All other bits affect translation, caching, or Xen's safety.
++ */
++#define FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST \
++ (_PAGE_NX_BIT | _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH | _PAGE_AVAIL | _PAGE_GLOBAL | \
++ _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER)
++
+ /* Update the L1 entry at pl1e to new value nl1e. */
+ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
+ unsigned long gl1mfn, int preserve_ad,
+@@ -1735,9 +1743,8 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping, r/w, presence, and cachability. */
+- if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e,
+- PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom);
+ if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
+@@ -1819,11 +1826,8 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+- if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e,
+- unlikely(opt_allow_superpage)
+- ? _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT
+- : _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
+ if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad) )
+@@ -1888,8 +1892,8 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+- if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l3e(nl3e, d);
+ rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l3, pl3e, ol3e, nl3e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
+@@ -1952,8 +1956,8 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+- if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l4e(nl4e, d);
+ rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l4, pl4e, ol4e, nl4e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+index 6dc9646..03c024c 100644
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/page.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ void efi_update_l4_pgtable(unsigned int l4idx, l4_pgentry_t);
+ #define _PAGE_AVAIL2 _AC(0x800,U)
+ #define _PAGE_AVAIL _AC(0xE00,U)
+ #define _PAGE_PSE_PAT _AC(0x1000,U)
++#define _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH (_AC(0x7ff, U) << 12)
+ /* non-architectural flags */
+ #define _PAGE_PAGED 0x2000U
+ #define _PAGE_SHARED 0x4000U
+--
+2.1.4
+
diff -r 78168b9e49e1 -r 5f5a4027adc2 sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183 Tue Jul 26 14:31:56 2016 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA-183,v 1.1 2016/07/26 14:31:57 bouyer Exp $
+
+From 777ebe30e81ab284f9b78392875fe884a593df35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2016 18:32:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/entry: Avoid SMAP violation in
+ compat_create_bounce_frame()
+
+A 32bit guest kernel might be running on user mappings.
+compat_create_bounce_frame() must whitelist its guest accesses to avoid
+risking a SMAP violation.
+
+For both variants of create_bounce_frame(), re-blacklist user accesses if
+execution exits via an exception table redirection.
+
+This is XSA-183 / CVE-2016-6259
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+---
+v2:
+ * Include CLAC on the exit paths from compat_create_bounce_frame which occur
+ from faults attempting to load %fs
+ * Reposition ASM_STAC to avoid breaking the macro-op fusion of test/jz
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 3 +++
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+index 0e3db7c..1eaf4bb 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+@@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ ENTRY(compat_int80_direct_trap)
+ compat_create_bounce_frame:
+ ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED
+ mov %fs,%edi
++ ASM_STAC
+ testb $2,UREGS_cs+8(%rsp)
+ jz 1f
+ /* Push new frame at registered guest-OS stack base. */
+@@ -403,6 +404,7 @@ UNLIKELY_START(nz, compat_bounce_failsafe)
+ movl %ds,%eax
+ .Lft12: movl %eax,%fs:0*4(%rsi) # DS
+ UNLIKELY_END(compat_bounce_failsafe)
++ ASM_CLAC
+ /* Rewrite our stack frame and return to guest-OS mode. */
+ /* IA32 Ref. Vol. 3: TF, VM, RF and NT flags are cleared on trap. */
+ andl $~(X86_EFLAGS_VM|X86_EFLAGS_RF|\
+@@ -448,6 +450,7 @@ compat_crash_page_fault_4:
+ addl $4,%esi
+ compat_crash_page_fault:
+ .Lft14: mov %edi,%fs
++ ASM_CLAC
+ movl %esi,%edi
+ call show_page_walk
+ jmp dom_crash_sync_extable
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+index 6e27508..0c2e63a 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+@@ -462,9 +462,11 @@ domain_crash_page_fault_16:
+ domain_crash_page_fault_8:
+ addq $8,%rsi
+ domain_crash_page_fault:
++ ASM_CLAC
+ movq %rsi,%rdi
+ call show_page_walk
+ ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable)
++ ASM_CLAC
+ # Get out of the guest-save area of the stack.
+ GET_STACK_BASE(%rax)
+ leaq STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(guest_cpu_user_regs)(%rax),%rsp
+--
+2.1.4
+
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