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[pkgsrc/trunk]: pkgsrc/security/openssh Update openssh to 7.3.1 (OpenSSH 7.3p1).
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/pkgsrc/rev/c9777a251c40
branches: trunk
changeset: 352731:c9777a251c40
user: taca <taca%pkgsrc.org@localhost>
date: Sun Sep 18 17:30:10 2016 +0000
description:
Update openssh to 7.3.1 (OpenSSH 7.3p1).
OpenSSH 7.3p1 is primarily a bugfix release and here is summary.
Changes since OpenSSH 7.2
=========================
Security
--------
* sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack against
the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An attacker could
send very long passwords that would cause excessive CPU use in
crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept password authentication
requests of length greater than 1024 characters. Independently
reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle), Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
* sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password authentication
that could be used to discern valid from invalid account names
when long passwords were sent and particular password hashing
algorithms are in use on the server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by
EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC padding
oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny
Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers
are disabled by default and only included for legacy compatibility.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC verification for
Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC algorithms to verify the
MAC before decrypting any ciphertext. This removes the possibility
of timing differences leaking facts about the plaintext, though no
such leakage has been observed. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele,
Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht.
* sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM environment vars when
UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to read user-specified
environment variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a
hostile local user may attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or
similar environment variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325,
found by Shayan Sadigh.
New Features
------------
* ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J command-line
flag to allow simplified indirection through a one or more SSH
bastions or "jump hosts".
* ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying specific
agent sockets instead of accepting one from the environment.
* ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be
optionally overridden when using ssh -W. bz#2577
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal mode as
per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed Diffie-Hellman
2K, 4K and 8K groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03.
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA
signatures in certificates;
* ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files.
* ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners sent
from the server. bz#2058
Bugfixes
--------
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common
protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585
* sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations and
accept AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not
requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398
* sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN
ATTEMPT!" message when forward and reverse DNS don't match. bz#2585
* ssh(1): Close ControlPersist background process stderr except
in debug mode or when logging to syslog. bz#1988
* misc: Make PROTOCOL description for direct-streamlocal%openssh.com@localhost
channel open messages match deployed code. bz#2529
* ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to fix
failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname
canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562
* sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes" file
that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559.
* sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh
hostname processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts; bz#2554
* ssh(1): Fix authentication using lone certificate keys in an agent
without corresponding private keys on the filesystem. bz#2550
* sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based
RekeyLimit is set; previously keepalive packets were not being
sent. bz#2252
diffstat:
security/openssh/Makefile | 7 +++----
security/openssh/distinfo | 14 +++++++-------
security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c | 10 +++++-----
security/openssh/patches/patch-session.c | 24 +++++++-----------------
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diffs (136 lines):
diff -r 6666e5b3824f -r c9777a251c40 security/openssh/Makefile
--- a/security/openssh/Makefile Sun Sep 18 17:15:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/Makefile Sun Sep 18 17:30:10 2016 +0000
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.248 2016/07/10 10:41:38 rillig Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.249 2016/09/18 17:30:10 taca Exp $
-DISTNAME= openssh-7.2p2
-PKGNAME= ${DISTNAME:S/p2/.2/}
-PKGREVISION= 3
+DISTNAME= openssh-7.3p1
+PKGNAME= ${DISTNAME:S/p1/.1/}
CATEGORIES= security
MASTER_SITES= ${MASTER_SITE_OPENBSD:=OpenSSH/portable/}
diff -r 6666e5b3824f -r c9777a251c40 security/openssh/distinfo
--- a/security/openssh/distinfo Sun Sep 18 17:15:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/distinfo Sun Sep 18 17:30:10 2016 +0000
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.101 2016/06/06 08:55:35 taca Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.102 2016/09/18 17:30:10 taca Exp $
-SHA1 (openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz) = 70e35d7d6386fe08abbd823b3a12a3ca44ac6d38
-RMD160 (openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz) = d18d73719ceeefa5116b5b741124f3604d7ddb99
-SHA512 (openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz) = 44f62b3a7bc50a0735d496a5aedeefb71550d8c10ad8f22b94e29fcc8084842db96e8c4ca41fced17af69e1aab09ed1182a12ad8650d9a46fd8743a0344df95b
-Size (openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz) = 1499808 bytes
+SHA1 (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = bfade84283fcba885e2084343ab19a08c7d123a5
+RMD160 (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = 823fc1e16c5d27a2361ed0b22f5ee24be11d2c13
+SHA512 (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = 7ba2d6140f38bd359ebf32ef17626e0ae1c00c3a38c01877b7c6b0317d030f10a8f82a0a51fc3b6273619de9ed73e24b8cf107b1e968f927053a3bedf97ff801
+Size (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = 1522617 bytes
SHA1 (patch-Makefile.in) = 98960119bda68a663214c8880484552f1207bcfc
-SHA1 (patch-auth-passwd.c) = 92c487cc3c092efb56f8b4ac4ca08ccd67803a83
+SHA1 (patch-auth-passwd.c) = 5205ca4d15dbcd3f4c574f0a2fb7713ae69af5f7
SHA1 (patch-auth-rhosts.c) = a5e6131e63b83a7e8a06cd80f22def449d6bc2c4
SHA1 (patch-auth.c) = cd13f8b31b45d668c5e09eca098b17ec8a7c1039
SHA1 (patch-auth1.c) = cdac14ffa4008e62926526e66316b0a553435374
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
SHA1 (patch-platform.c) = f8f211dbc5e596c0f82eb86324d18a84c6151ec5
SHA1 (patch-sandbox-darwin.c) = c9a1fe2e4dbf98e929d983b4206a244e0e354b75
SHA1 (patch-scp.c) = 9c2317b0f796641903a826db355ba06595a26ea1
-SHA1 (patch-session.c) = 2a7276382278f70ac1d8f51f273e8ffa2c0c59d2
+SHA1 (patch-session.c) = 850cef27299cf8af6a19987d5e070bf501cd57fb
SHA1 (patch-sftp-common.c) = 6819aa040c8f1caa30a704cf6f0588e498df8778
SHA1 (patch-ssh.c) = 6877d8205d999906c14240d4d112b084609927ca
SHA1 (patch-sshd.8) = 5bf48cd27cef8e8810b9dc7115f5180102a345d1
diff -r 6666e5b3824f -r c9777a251c40 security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c
--- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c Sun Sep 18 17:15:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c Sun Sep 18 17:30:10 2016 +0000
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-auth-passwd.c,v 1.3 2016/01/18 12:53:26 jperkin Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-auth-passwd.c,v 1.4 2016/09/18 17:30:11 taca Exp $
Replace uid 0 with ROOTUID macro
---- auth-passwd.c.orig 2015-08-21 04:49:03.000000000 +0000
+--- auth-passwd.c.orig 2016-07-27 22:54:27.000000000 +0000
+++ auth-passwd.c
-@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
- #endif
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
+ return 0;
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
ok = 0;
#endif
if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
-@@ -123,7 +123,12 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
+@@ -128,7 +128,12 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
}
#endif
diff -r 6666e5b3824f -r c9777a251c40 security/openssh/patches/patch-session.c
--- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-session.c Sun Sep 18 17:15:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-session.c Sun Sep 18 17:30:10 2016 +0000
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-session.c,v 1.6 2016/06/06 08:55:35 taca Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-session.c,v 1.7 2016/09/18 17:30:11 taca Exp $
* Interix support.
-* Fix for CVE-2015-8325
---- session.c.orig 2016-03-09 18:04:48.000000000 +0000
+--- session.c.orig 2016-07-27 22:54:27.000000000 +0000
+++ session.c
-@@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@ read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_in
+@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_in
if (tmpenv == NULL)
return;
@@ -14,7 +13,7 @@
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
else
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
-@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+@@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
@@ -23,16 +22,7 @@
SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
}
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
-@@ -1317,7 +1317,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
- * Pull in any environment variables that may have
- * been set by PAM.
- */
-- if (options.use_pam) {
-+ if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
- char **p;
-
- p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
-@@ -1340,6 +1340,18 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+@@ -1346,6 +1346,18 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
}
@@ -51,7 +41,7 @@
if (debug_flag) {
/* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
-@@ -1531,11 +1543,13 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+@@ -1537,11 +1549,13 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
perror("setgid");
exit(1);
}
@@ -65,7 +55,7 @@
endgrent();
#endif
-@@ -2381,7 +2395,7 @@ session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+@@ -2388,7 +2402,7 @@ session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
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