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[pkgsrc/trunk]: pkgsrc/net/wpa_supplicant wpa_supplicant: apply upstream patc...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/pkgsrc/rev/12a25d53a22f
branches: trunk
changeset: 370362:12a25d53a22f
user: maya <maya%pkgsrc.org@localhost>
date: Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
description:
wpa_supplicant: apply upstream patch for security advisory
Patches from Juoni Malinen and Mathy Vanhoef.
Fixes:
- CVE-2017-13077
- CVE-2017-13078
- CVE-2017-13079
- CVE-2017-13080
- CVE-2017-13081
- CVE-2017-13082
- CVE-2017-13086
- CVE-2017-13087
- CVE-2017-13088
Tested by leot, thanks!
Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
frames on RX side.
This issue was introduced by the commit
0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
failed.
Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
sequence counter associated to the group key.
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
Mode cases
This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
detect a possible key reconfiguration.
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
This fixes the earlier fix in commit
ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
message 3/4.
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
that behavior does not get modified.
For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
request
Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
Reassociation Response frame.
diffstat:
net/wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 3 +-
net/wpa_supplicant/distinfo | 13 +-
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_ieee802__11.c | 46 +++++
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.c | 42 ++++
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.h | 21 ++
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__ft.c | 35 ++++
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__i.h | 12 +
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_common_wpa__common.h | 12 +
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_rsn__supp_tdls.c | 104 ++++++++++++
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa.c | 14 +
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa__ft.c | 33 +++
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa__i.h | 12 +
net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-wpa__supplicant_wnm__sta.c | 22 ++
13 files changed, 367 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 433 to 300 lines):
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
--- a/net/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Mon Oct 16 10:23:04 2017 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/Makefile Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.17 2016/11/16 15:07:34 maya Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.18 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
#
DISTNAME= wpa_supplicant-2.6
+PKGREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= net
MASTER_SITES= http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/distinfo
--- a/net/wpa_supplicant/distinfo Mon Oct 16 10:23:04 2017 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/distinfo Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.9 2016/11/16 15:07:34 maya Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.10 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
SHA1 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 8189704e257c3e9f8300c49dc6e49a381b1d6299
RMD160 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 2fb26394d22ac3acde2d9d7c6543af8eaac9c55a
SHA512 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 46442cddb6ca043b8b08d143908f149954c238e0f3a57a0df73ca4fab9c1acd91b078f3f26375a1d99cd1d65625986328018c735d8705882c8f91e389cad28a6
Size (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 2753524 bytes
SHA1 (patch-aa) = 998ba9cc4ef9ebd0b629a6368957da0f1159dda0
+SHA1 (patch-src_ap_ieee802__11.c) = 8edce32847c55e0ac49b395b2aa5f370c6055bd5
+SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.c) = 2631770dfe42fba748ab4be4174998fff30e1f24
+SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.h) = 8e44f75449e656a710747a8cd581ff9d05c5eff6
+SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__ft.c) = ed4a15b05c46bb88ce9bf597c65088311fa47852
+SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__i.h) = f33a5214d0c8071f7eed9dd5fd67b6b32f0e856c
+SHA1 (patch-src_common_wpa__common.h) = 853adbcf1749d7ccd80feeb4aa6aa8ba8ac0a7e8
+SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_tdls.c) = b695b8096661894e8e473ccb09386c33a8353a45
+SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa.c) = 4a4d966e68481eef76e7323e3d69c4c5bf8e6432
+SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa__ft.c) = c48b83ee5e10289d21ac3310ab92684dc69bdced
+SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa__i.h) = f2c9260cf6bdf59493f9870fbedc0d4e0881b641
+SHA1 (patch-wpa__supplicant_wnm__sta.c) = 818b9fcabeac9d3c6ced075a5a804b34c0d56774
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_ieee802__11.c
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_ieee802__11.c Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-src_ap_ieee802__11.c,v 1.1 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
+
+--- src/ap/ieee802_11.c.orig 2016-10-02 18:51:11.000000000 +0000
++++ src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
+ struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
++ int set = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
+@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos
+ * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
+ * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
+ * does not support full AP client state.
++ *
++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
++ * the same key.
+ */
+- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
++ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
+ hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
++ set = 0;
++ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
+ if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
+@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos
+ sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
+ sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
+ sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
+- sta->added_unassoc)) {
++ set)) {
+ hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
+ HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
+ "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
+- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
++ set ? "set" : "add");
+
+ if (sta->added_unassoc) {
+ hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.c
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.c Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.c,v 1.1 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
+
+--- src/ap/wpa_auth.c.orig 2017-10-16 10:06:59.832697934 +0000
++++ src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ }
+
+
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+ u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
+@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++ else
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ break;
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.h
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.h Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.h,v 1.1 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
+
+--- src/ap/wpa_auth.h.orig 2016-10-02 18:51:11.000000000 +0000
++++ src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticato
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+ WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_sta
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__ft.c
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__ft.c Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__ft.c,v 1.1 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
+
+--- src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c.orig 2016-10-02 18:51:11.000000000 +0000
++++ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++ * PN in the driver */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state
+
+ /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struc
+
+ sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+
+ buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__i.h
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__i.h Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__i.h,v 1.1 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
+
+--- src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h.orig 2016-10-02 18:51:11.000000000 +0000
++++ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ Boolean PTK_valid;
+ Boolean pairwise_set;
++ Boolean tk_already_set;
+ int keycount;
+ Boolean Pair;
+ struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_common_wpa__common.h
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_common_wpa__common.h Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-src_common_wpa__common.h,v 1.1 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
+
+--- src/common/wpa_common.h.orig 2016-10-02 18:51:11.000000000 +0000
++++ src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t kck_len;
+ size_t kek_len;
+ size_t tk_len;
++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+
+
diff -r dbfa9cede05a -r 12a25d53a22f net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_rsn__supp_tdls.c
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/net/wpa_supplicant/patches/patch-src_rsn__supp_tdls.c Mon Oct 16 10:26:21 2017 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-src_rsn__supp_tdls.c,v 1.1 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
+
+--- src/rsn_supp/tdls.c.orig 2016-10-02 18:51:11.000000000 +0000
++++ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ } tpk;
+ int tpk_set;
++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ int tpk_success;
+ int tpk_in_progress;
+
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_s
+ u8 rsc[6];
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+
++ if (peer->tk_set) {
++ /*
++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++ * not allow that to happen.
++ */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+
+ switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_s
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ "driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct w
+ peer->cipher = 0;
+ peer->qos_info = 0;
+ peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct w
+ }
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