Re: kern/46463: netbsd-6: panic and filesystem corruption running tmux

[christos%zoulas.com@localhost (Christos Zoulas)]

The following reply was made to PR kern/46463; it has been noted by GNATS.

From: christos%zoulas.com@localhost (Christos Zoulas)
To: Martin Husemann <martin%duskware.de@localhost>
Cc: gnats-bugs%NetBSD.org@localhost
Subject: Re: kern/46463: netbsd-6:  panic and filesystem corruption running tmux
Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 09:30:44 -0400

 On May 31,  3:23pm, martin%duskware.de@localhost (Martin Husemann) wrote:
 -- Subject: Re: kern/46463: netbsd-6:  panic and filesystem corruption runnin
 
 | On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 09:18:53AM -0400, Christos Zoulas wrote:
 | > What's the harm in letting them through and making them work properly in
 | > the new process?
 | 
 | None, probably. Needs a bit of carefull review. However, I don't see
 | any use case where this would make sense from a userland perspective.
 
 It would make sense if you wanted an unprivileged process monitor a
 file descriptor monitor something what does not have access to, without
 making the client setuid. From the orthogonality POV, I don't see why
 file descriptor handling should be special-cased. It should just work
 as expected, i.e. a file descriptor passed from one process to another
 should function properly regardless of type.
 
 christos