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Re: getrandom and getentropy

nia wrote:
> For years, the development hivemind's advice has been "/dev/random bad!
> always urandom!", because having interfaces that unpredictably block on
> you is a terrible idea.

Yes, that has been the advice.  I think it's bad advice, but it's
understandable given the historical /dev/random behavior of
"exhausting" entropy, which has made it block too often and for no
good reason, making more or less unusable in practice.  I'm hoping
that now that NetBSD's /dev/random no longer does that, we can get
past that and start actually using it in more places.

> As such, there's a hell of a lot of software out there that relies on
> urandom (... "GRND_INSECURE", KERN_ARND equivalent in behaviour on
> NetBSD) for tasks such as key generation, under the assumption it's
> Good Enough. Tracking down all the instances of this (e.g. in scripts)
> would take you a long time.

Yes.  But don't see how that's releveant to the question at hand,
whether getentropy() should behave like /dev/random or /dev/urandom.

> After some pushing, I'm fairly confident that NetBSD should enter
> userland with a good-as-possible state for all observable random
> number generators. After several reboots, on a long lived system,
> it'll be in an even better state. Blocking should /only/ be observed
> by applications that are started early in the life of a system that
> /cannot/ provide enough entropy (because the hardware is old or very
> low end, with few useful sources), or a system that's been initialized
> improperly (with a bad on-disk seed). In this case the kernel makes sure
> the operator is aware that the system is in a dangerous state.

I actually agree with all of this.  I also think one of the ways the
kernel should make sure the operator is aware that the system is in a
dangerous state is by making getentropy() block.

> I think the naming (INSECURE is deeply scary) and general design of
> the Linux interface is unfortunate. It pushes people towards bad
> things, and misconceptions about how randomness actually works.

The Linux interfaces confuse me.  I just looked at the getrandom(2)
man page on a Debian GNU/Linux 10 system, and it doesn't even mention
an INSECURE flag.  It says getentropy() uses "the same source as the
/dev/urandom device" by default, and you need to specify GRND_RANDOM
to get /dev/random.  This seems to be at odds with what Taylor wrote

	 * Recommended default usage -- may block once at boot time;
	 * otherwise never blocks.  Limited only to 33554431 bytes.
	if (getrandom(buf, buflen, 0) == -1)

When I suggested making getentropy equivalent to getrandom(..., 0)
earlier, I was referring to the getrandom() semantics from Taylor's
mail, not those in the Debian 10 man page.

> If implemented as described, GRND_INSECURE would not be particularly
> scary on a typical NetBSD system.

Maybe, but an interface documented as providing "high quality entropy"
needs to be be non-scary even on non-typical systems.

> Of course, none of this is at all helpful if there's doubt as to
> whether the trusted sources of randomness actually can't be trusted
> (plausible when running a VM on an untrusted host machine, less
> plusible but still possible otherwise).
> In which case, we're all screwed, regardless of our interfaces.

Of course.  But the way I read the specification of getentropy(),
it implies "trusted", and that of /dev/urandom implies "non-trusted",
so you can't implement the former in terms of the lattter.
Andreas Gustafsson,

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