Subject: Re: suid helper to verify own passwd
To: None <tech-security@netbsd.org>
From: Travis H. <travis@subspacefield.org>
List: tech-security
Date: 12/25/2006 22:45:21
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On Thu, Dec 21, 2006 at 10:15:34PM -0500, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> > > What exactly is the point of this?  The program which prompted for the
> > > user's password, after all,
[and might be swapped out]

> > Isn't it possible for the program to read the password into a mlock()ed
> > buffer when prompting for it? Maybe it's futile for a X11 application
> > but if you're reading it from a TTY or some other file descriptor, that=
's
> > possible, isn't it?
>=20
> 1) Do you believe that this is what programs that prompt for passwords
>    actually do?

Should do?

> 2) If this were what programs that prompted for passwords actually did,
>    then what you propose might protect against an attacker who did not
>    have root access to the machine now, but could at some point in the
>    future, if the programs were swapped out and those swap pages never
>    overwritten.   But, in fact, anyone who _does_ have access to not even
>    root, but instead the euid of the program that is prompting for the
>    password, can simply steal the password _now_.  So I am not sure what,
>    in the real world, this change would gain you.

What if the person might have physical access to the HDD later, like if
the company goes bust and their assets liquidated?

I recall in Garfinkel's paper "A Rememberance of Data Past" that they were
able to recover SSNs and other sensitive information from many used drives.

Maybe it's not relevant to a password, but I wouldn't be so swift to
make sweeping statements about the threat model.

> But that seems like a lot of complexity for a very
> hypothetical gain -- particularly when those worried about such attacks
> can (and should) just encrypt their entire swap partitions.

In this case, agreed.  I think the program is sufficiently simple that
it's unlikely to be a vulnerability, and that making it more complex
in order to deal with relatively minor threats would likely make is less
safe.
--=20
A: No.
Q: Should I include quotations after my reply?
<URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/> -><-

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