In message <Pine.NEB.4.62.0503031625170.12890@server.duh.org>, Todd Vierling writes:
>On Thu, 3 Mar 2005, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
>
>> And if CGD is _so_ officially approved as you say, then I can not
>> for the life of me understand how it can use the same key to generate
>> the IV and perform the encryption.  At the very least two different
>> keys should have been used at the "expense" of making the masterkey
>> 512 bits instead of 256.
>
>Technically, two different keys are used.  The IV is generated from the
>block number (although it's pluggable for other IV generation methods,
>should one be desired; take a look!).

As I read it, he encrypts the block number using the key to get the IV
which he then uses with the key to encrypt the data.

Since the attacker know the block number the IV generation doesn't
add strength.

In fact expose any weakness in the algorithm even more because it
offers two-way leverage on the algorithm.

It also adds a very efficient hit-detector for a brute force attack.

It would have been much better to use a different key to generate the IV.

And did he salt the block number at all ?  I don't think so...


-- 
Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
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Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.