In message <20050303163731.GA8001@panix.com>, Thor Lancelot Simon writes:

>I could not disagree more.  When it comes to nonstandard homebrewed
>cryptosystems foisted off on unsuspecting users with a bundle of
>claims of algorithm strength that they're not competent to evaluate
>for themselves, we do not need more ideas, nor more people trying
>out ideas; we need less.
>
>Standard, widely analyzed cryptographic algorithms are good.

s/ are good/, when applied with caution and wisdom, are good/

:-)

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