Subject: Re: verified executable kernel modification committed
To: Brett Lymn <blymn@baesystems.com.au>
From: Perry E. Metzger <perry@piermont.com>
List: tech-security
Date: 11/03/2002 23:34:31
Brett Lymn <blymn@baesystems.com.au> writes:
> On Mon, Nov 04, 2002 at 02:03:36PM +1100, matthew green wrote:
> > will i?  if i can overwrite the file, i can overwrite the file that has
> > the fingerprints on it.  as you probably won't reverify the binary until
> > next reboot.... boom.  same flaw - again.
> 
> Unless the fingerprints are on ro media (something you can do now) or
> have been signed (something I want to look at doing).

You can overwrite the key used for checking the signature.

"It's turtles all the way down."

Read only media? Sure, but once you have read only media, you have to
put everything in the trust path onto that media, including the
kernel, programs for loading the hashes, etc. At which point, of
course, you wonder why you didn't just use read only media for the
whole task....

-- 
Perry E. Metzger		perry@piermont.com