Subject: Re: Fwd: CERT Advisory CA-2002-12 Format String Vulnerability in
To: Paul Hoffman , <da@securityfocus.com>
From: Jeremy C. Reed <reed@reedmedia.net>
List: tech-security
Date: 05/08/2002 21:43:56
On Wed, 8 May 2002, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> >Probably the changes are very little when compared to official 3.0 Beta 2
> >Patchlevel 24.
>
> So you are saying we forked and stopped?

Just like other programs under /usr/src/dist, they get updated when
someone dedicates the time to review the official code and have time to
integrate it.

> >Just because a syslog formatting was improved doesn't mean that a security
> >issue was fixed. Probably the vulnerability wasn't even known.
>
> Sorry, I can't parse that. Do you mean that we did a sweep, found
> some suspicious-looking stuff, fixed it, but didn't report the
> suspicious-looking stuff to ISC? If so, that doesn't seem like a good
> thing for everyone else on the Internet...

It probably was not "suspicious". And anyways I don't know if the
patches were sent to ISC.

On Wed, 8 May 2002, Dave Ahmad wrote:

> Well, it was found during a 'sweep', was it not?  And I think it's a safe
> assumption that this format string sweep was carried out to find
> possible security problems.

I would not assume it was done to "find" security problems.

I would guess that hundreds and maybe thousands of string formatting
improvements have been done with the code this past few years.

Just like another BSD says: they don't try to find exploits for the code
and they don't have time to report every little fix -- especially since
most probably aren't ever exploitable.

> I found the NetBSD response in the CERT advisory a little strange myself
> -- it seems to me that a bug discovered in ISC dhcpd would

Who says that NetBSD fixed a bug?

They were just routine format string cleanups.

   Jeremy C. Reed
   http://bsd.reedmedia.net/