Subject: Re: setuid ssh
To: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
From: Andrew Brown <atatat@atatdot.net>
List: tech-security
Date: 10/18/2000 10:13:40
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Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2000 10:13:40 -0400
From: Andrew Brown <atatat@atatdot.net>
To: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
Cc: Atsushi Onoe <onoe@sm.sony.co.jp>, cjs@cynic.net,
   hubert.feyrer@informatik.fh-regensburg.de, tech-security@netbsd.org
Subject: Re: setuid ssh
Message-ID: <20001018101339.A29982@noc.untraceable.net>
Reply-To: Andrew Brown <atatat@atatdot.net>
References: <atatat@atatdot.net> <20001018141036.1EB702A2A@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
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>> ...unless it used the long term private half to sign the short term
>> public half that the agent was storing.  
>
>That's what I said:
>
>> >use the user's long-term key to sign a short-term "certificate"
>> >saying that the temporary keypair is equivalent to the long-term
>> >key for some (short) lifetime."
>
>so, moving on:

okay, but i was just rephrasing to test my understanding.  :P

>> ssh-agent would never need to know about the long term key.
>
>correct; the signing could happen in ssh-add.

good.

>> ...of course, a new form of rsa authentication would have to be added:
>> SSH_AUTH_RSA_RSA with the long term public piece, the signature on the
>> short term public half that the long term public half can be used to
>> verify, and the short term public half.  
>
>you want to sign more than just the short-term key; you also need to
>sign a mini-certificate including a validity period so that the end
>server can enforce expiration of the short-term key.

a mini-certificate?  it could just be a time_t, yes?  appended to the
key before hashing for signing, and then kept with it.  or am i again
simply restating what you said?

-- 
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