Subject: Re: [secure@FREEBSD.LUBLIN.PL: FreeBSD (and other BSDs?) local root explot]
To: Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
List: tech-security
Date: 08/27/1999 10:57:54
by redmail.netbsd.org with SMTP; 27 Aug 1999 14:58:16 -0000
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To: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
cc: Manuel Bouyer <bouyer@antioche.lip6.fr>, tech-security@netbsd.org
Subject: Re: [secure@FREEBSD.LUBLIN.PL: FreeBSD (and other BSDs?) local root explot]
In-Reply-To: Message from "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
of "Fri, 27 Aug 1999 08:46:37 MDT." <199908271446.IAA10338@xerxes.cs.colorado.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 1999 10:57:54 -0400
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
I think coredumps through symlinks are dangerous in general and should
just be disabled.
IMHO what the folks creating symlinks to not send their coredumps into
NFS "really" want is a per-process inherited attribute which i'll call
the "core filename format".
Currently it's "%n.core"
reasonable things might be:
format chars:
n: program name
p: process id
u: user login name (as set by setlogin(2)), ...
Implementing this seems like a reasonable afternoon project and
doesn't seem fraught with risk like the "check owner of symlink" thing
would be..
- Bill