># Actually netbsd chroot seems to have fixed the easy escape,
># can fchroot be used instead:
># 	fd = open("/",..);
># 	chroot(path);
># 	....
># 	fchroot(fd);
>
>I just had a thought.  Presumably, the reason for not permitting chroot()
>is that one could potentially hard link something like login or su into
>their tree, provide their own password databases and gain root access via
>a shell.  At least that was the rationale explained to me for not allowing
>chroot() by normal users.

that's exactly it.  it's trivial to do, too, and requires about three
minutes of thought.  and a properly writable filesystem.

>What if chroot() were to create/cause exec semantics such that, if not
>called by a super-user, setuid/setgid would be ignored?

that would be...almost pointless, no?  i mean, if the binary weren't
setuid *at all*, then root could still switch to the appropriate
uid/gid...

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