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Re: regarding support of NFS versions (Re: Changing NGROUPS_MAX to 1024?)



Hello,

On 4/20/26 08:41, od2uvb%0w.se@localhost wrote:
To allow a compromise of a single unit attached to a "protected network"
to make most of the data accessible? It makes sense, when the value of
the data is so low that no attacker would ever care, or when the network
is really small and under total control.
This excludes any large/heterogeneous installation with nontrivial data.

(yes, adding Kerberos to NFSv3 would improve this, but would leave its

other limitations in place)


Hi,

I’m currently running a bit of NFS again on NetBSD for simple private use cases in my now Windows-free home network. The setup is fairly typical: a NetBSD server exporting via NFSv3, with a few Linux clients.

The security concerns you mentioned apply quite directly here. Even in a “trusted” LAN, the implicit trust model of NFSv3 feels increasingly out of place, especially once the network is no longer trivial in size or composition.

What I’m currently considering is to move the trust boundary away from the LAN itself and instead enforce it via a WireGuard overlay. Concretely, all clients (even those on the local network) would access the NFS server exclusively through WireGuard.

This would allow me to:

- assign stable, server-controlled IP addresses to each client within the WireGuard network - restrict exports based on those addresses, effectively tightening host-level access control
- differentiate read/write permissions per client in a more controlled way
- avoid relying on the ambient trust of the LAN

It’s still a fairly simple model, but it at least contains the blast radius: a compromised LAN node would not automatically gain NFS access unless it also holds valid WireGuard credentials.

I haven’t pushed the idea much further yet, but at the moment it seems like a reasonable compromise between keeping NFSv3 for its simplicity and mitigating its weakest security properties without introducing significantly more complex infrastructure.

Curious if others have taken a similar approach or see obvious pitfalls.

Best regards
Matthias

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