Re: core statement on fexecve, O_EXEC, and O_SEARCH

[David Holland <dholland-tech%netbsd.org@localhost>]

On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 04:03:40PM -0500, Mouse wrote:
 > >>   * whether the name in question is within the process' current
 > >>     root (forbidding fchdir and fchroot otherwise).
 > > Definitely.
 > 
 > I'm actually not convinced this is so obviously a good thing.
 > 
 > I see an analogy between root directories and UIDs.  We have chroot(),
 > and we have setuid() - but we also have setreuid().  I can see
 > potential use for chroot-hopping between multiple directories.
 > 
 > I'm not sure NetBSD should support that.  But I'm not sure it should
 > forbid it, either.  I'm not sure how I'd design an interface for it,
 > but it might be worth thinking about when implementing whatever NetBSD
 > eventually decides on.

Well, let me refine what I said: this should be part of the
permissions scheme for capability passing.

-- 
David A. Holland
dholland%netbsd.org@localhost