>> However, if *root* did the chroot, there's no need to disable
>> set-id.  That's why I proposed a separate state bit for the process,
>> indicating that it has done a non-root chroot.
> "however, if *root* did the chroot, there's no need"...for root to
> run a suid binary to regain privileges.

Not necessarily true.  If you've set up a shadow system (say you're
testing a new userland), you may have some services in inetd set up to
chroot to the new tree before running their daemons...in which case you
more or less *need* the new system to behave as much like a real system
as possible, including having set-id binaries work.

chroot isn't just for jails.

					der Mouse

			       mouse@rodents.montreal.qc.ca
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