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[src-draft/trunk]: src/sys/arch/x86/x86 Zero the fpu registers on fpu_kern_le...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src-all/rev/74bfad1c2e83
branches: trunk
changeset: 934463:74bfad1c2e83
user: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Thu Jun 04 03:30:18 2020 +0000
description:
Zero the fpu registers on fpu_kern_leave.
Avoid Spectre-class attacks on any values left in them.
diffstat:
sys/arch/x86/x86/fpu.c | 9 +++++++++
1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diffs (26 lines):
diff -r d0dc4b9eb047 -r 74bfad1c2e83 sys/arch/x86/x86/fpu.c
--- a/sys/arch/x86/x86/fpu.c Fri May 29 20:34:04 2020 +0000
+++ b/sys/arch/x86/x86/fpu.c Thu Jun 04 03:30:18 2020 +0000
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@
void
fpu_kern_leave(void)
{
+ union savefpu zero_fpu __aligned(64);
struct cpu_info *ci = curcpu();
int s;
@@ -385,6 +386,14 @@
KASSERT(ci->ci_kfpu_spl != -1);
/*
+ * Zero the fpu registers; otherwise we might leak secrets
+ * through Spectre-class attacks to userland, even if there are
+ * no bugs in fpu state management.
+ */
+ memset(&zero_fpu, 0, sizeof(zero_fpu));
+ fpu_area_restore(&zero_fpu, x86_xsave_features);
+
+ /*
* Set CR0_TS again so that the kernel can't accidentally use
* the FPU.
*/
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