Source-Changes-HG archive
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index][Old Index]
[src/netbsd-6-0]: src/external/bsd/wpa/dist Pull up following revision(s) (re...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/b4f4c386e7bc
branches: netbsd-6-0
changeset: 775274:b4f4c386e7bc
user: martin <martin%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
description:
Pull up following revision(s) (requested by spz in ticket #1507):
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/ieee802_11.c: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.h: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/common/wpa_common.h: revision 1.3
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c: revision 1.2
external/bsd/wpa/dist/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c: revision 1.4
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.c: revision 1.10
apply patches from upstream, namely from <a rel="nofollow" href="https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/";>https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/</a> :
rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch 02-Oct-2017 16:19 6.1K
rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch 02-Oct-2017 16:19 7.7K
rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch 02-Oct-2017 16:19 6.7K
rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
02-Oct-2017 16:19 2.5K
rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
02-Oct-2017 16:19 1.9K
rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
02-Oct-2017 16:19 4.2K
rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch 02-Oct-2017 16:19 1.6K
rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch 02-Oct-2017 16:19 2.7K
for CVE-2017-13077 CVE-2017-13078 CVE-2017-13079 CVE-2017-13080
CVE-2017-13081 CVE-2017-13082 CVE-2017-13086 CVE-2017-13087 CVE-2017-13088
(see
<a rel="nofollow" href="https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt";>https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt</a>
for details)
diffstat:
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 ++-
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 35 +++++-
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 +-
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 +
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/common/wpa_common.h | 12 +
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 +++++-
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++--------
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 +
external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 8 +-
external/bsd/wpa/dist/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +-
11 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 670 to 300 lines):
diff -r fd3e6699c214 -r b4f4c386e7bc external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
--- a/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/ieee802_11.c Fri Oct 13 08:04:27 2017 +0000
+++ b/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/ieee802_11.c Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@
{
struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
+ int set = 1;
/*
* Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@
* FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
* skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
* does not support full AP client state.
+ *
+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
+ * the same key.
*/
- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
+ set = 0;
+ }
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@
sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
- sta->added_unassoc)) {
+ set)) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
"Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
+ set ? "set" : "add");
if (sta->added_unassoc) {
hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
diff -r fd3e6699c214 -r b4f4c386e7bc external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
--- a/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.c Fri Oct 13 08:04:27 2017 +0000
+++ b/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.c Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
@@ -1898,6 +1901,21 @@
}
+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+{
+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
{
u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
@@ -2455,9 +2473,12 @@
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
+ else
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
break;
case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
@@ -3250,6 +3271,14 @@
}
+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+{
+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
+ return 0;
+ return sm->tk_already_set;
+}
+
+
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
{
diff -r fd3e6699c214 -r b4f4c386e7bc external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
--- a/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.h Fri Oct 13 08:04:27 2017 +0000
+++ b/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth.h Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@
u8 *data, size_t data_len);
enum wpa_event {
WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
};
void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@
int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
diff -r fd3e6699c214 -r b4f4c386e7bc external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
--- a/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c Fri Oct 13 08:04:27 2017 +0000
+++ b/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@
return;
}
+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
+ * PN in the driver */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ return;
+ }
+
/* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
* most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
* after association has been completed. This function will be called
@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@
/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
}
@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@
sm->pairwise = pairwise;
sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
diff -r fd3e6699c214 -r b4f4c386e7bc external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
--- a/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h Fri Oct 13 08:04:27 2017 +0000
+++ b/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
struct wpa_ptk PTK;
Boolean PTK_valid;
Boolean pairwise_set;
+ Boolean tk_already_set;
int keycount;
Boolean Pair;
struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
diff -r fd3e6699c214 -r b4f4c386e7bc external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/common/wpa_common.h
--- a/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/common/wpa_common.h Fri Oct 13 08:04:27 2017 +0000
+++ b/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/common/wpa_common.h Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
@@ -218,8 +218,20 @@
size_t kck_len;
size_t kek_len;
size_t tk_len;
+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
};
+struct wpa_gtk {
+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t gtk_len;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+struct wpa_igtk {
+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t igtk_len;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
/* WPA IE version 1
* 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
diff -r fd3e6699c214 -r b4f4c386e7bc external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
--- a/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c Fri Oct 13 08:04:27 2017 +0000
+++ b/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c Tue Oct 17 16:02:43 2017 +0000
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
} tpk;
int tpk_set;
+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
int tpk_success;
int tpk_in_progress;
@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@
u8 rsc[6];
enum wpa_alg alg;
+ if (peer->tk_set) {
+ /*
+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
+ * not allow that to happen.
+ */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
switch (peer->cipher) {
@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@
return -1;
}
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
"driver");
return -1;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@
peer->cipher = 0;
peer->qos_info = 0;
peer->wmm_capable = 0;
- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@
wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
return -1;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@
}
+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
+ if (nonce[i])
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@
peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
peer->cipher = cipher;
- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
/*
* There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
* TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@
"TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
goto error;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
Home |
Main Index |
Thread Index |
Old Index