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[src/netbsd-1-5]: src/crypto/dist/ssh Pull up revisions 1.1.1.2-1.1.1.3 (requ...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/d720e619fe26
branches: netbsd-1-5
changeset: 490695:d720e619fe26
user: he <he%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Mon Feb 26 20:26:24 2001 +0000
description:
Pull up revisions 1.1.1.2-1.1.1.3 (requested by itojun):
Update SSH to version found on trunk as of 26 Feb 2001.
diffstat:
crypto/dist/ssh/auth-krb4.c | 391 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/auth-options.h | 44 +++
crypto/dist/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c | 115 +++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/auth-rsa.c | 299 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/authfd.h | 138 +++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/authfile.h | 51 ++++
crypto/dist/ssh/bufaux.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/bufaux.h | 60 ++++
crypto/dist/ssh/buffer.c | 159 +++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/buffer.h | 66 +++++
crypto/dist/ssh/cipher.h | 117 +++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/compress.h | 48 +++
crypto/dist/ssh/crc32.c | 114 +++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/crc32.h | 25 ++
crypto/dist/ssh/deattack.h | 30 ++
crypto/dist/ssh/dispatch.c | 79 ++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/getput.h | 58 ++++
crypto/dist/ssh/key.h | 75 ++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/log.c | 238 +++++++++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/login.c | 146 ++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/match.c | 139 +++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/match.h | 33 ++
crypto/dist/ssh/mpaux.h | 31 ++
crypto/dist/ssh/nchan.c | 493 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/packet.h | 217 ++++++++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/radix.c | 212 +++++++++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/rsa.c | 121 ++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/rsa.h | 25 ++
crypto/dist/ssh/scp.1 | 137 +++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/sftp-server.8 | 56 ++++
crypto/dist/ssh/ssh2.h | 142 +++++++++++
crypto/dist/ssh/sshconnect.h | 71 +++++
crypto/dist/ssh/uuencode.h | 32 ++
33 files changed, 4207 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 4339 to 300 lines):
diff -r 9ba954137180 -r d720e619fe26 crypto/dist/ssh/auth-krb4.c
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/crypto/dist/ssh/auth-krb4.c Mon Feb 26 20:26:24 2001 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.23 2001/01/22 08:15:00 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef AFS
+#include "radix.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB4
+char *ticket = NULL;
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * try krb4 authentication,
+ * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
+ */
+
+int
+auth_krb4_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password)
+{
+ AUTH_DAT adata;
+ KTEXT_ST tkt;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ u_long faddr;
+ char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ char phost[INST_SZ];
+ char realm[REALM_SZ];
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
+ * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
+ */
+ if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
+
+ /* Set up our ticket file. */
+ if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid)) {
+ log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
+ pw->pw_name);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ /* Try to get TGT using our password. */
+ r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "",
+ realm, "krbtgt", realm,
+ DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *) password);
+ if (r != INTK_OK) {
+ packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 password "
+ "authentication for %s failed: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ /* Successful authentication. */
+ chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
+ * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
+ * to a bogus Kerberos server.
+ */
+ (void) gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
+ (void) strlcpy(phost, (char *) krb_get_phost(localhost),
+ INST_SZ);
+ r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
+
+ if (r == KSUCCESS) {
+ if (!(hp = gethostbyname(localhost))) {
+ log("Couldn't get local host address!");
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ memmove((void *) &faddr, (void *) hp->h_addr,
+ sizeof(faddr));
+
+ /* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
+ r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
+ faddr, &adata, "");
+ if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
+ /*
+ * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
+ * localhost. Disallow login.
+ */
+ log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
+ "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ } else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+ log("Kerberos V4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
+ KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ } else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
+ /*
+ * Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
+ * log the error.
+ */
+ log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
+ "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
+ krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
+ */
+ packet_send_debug("WARNING: Kerberos V4 TGT "
+ "possibly spoofed for %s: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+
+ /* Authentication succeeded. */
+ return 1;
+
+kerberos_auth_failure:
+ krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+
+ if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
+ packet_send_debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
+ }
+ /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void
+krb4_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+{
+ debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
+ if (ticket) {
+ (void) dest_tkt();
+ xfree(ticket);
+ ticket = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+krb4_init(uid_t uid)
+{
+ static int cleanup_registered = 0;
+ const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
+ struct stat st;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (!ticket) {
+ /* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
+ ticket = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+#ifdef AFS
+ if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
+ tkt_root = "/ticket/";
+#endif /* AFS */
+ snprintf(ticket, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%d", tkt_root, uid, getpid());
+ (void) krb_set_tkt_string(ticket);
+ }
+ /* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
+ if (!cleanup_registered) {
+ fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+ cleanup_registered = 1;
+ }
+ /* Try to create our ticket file. */
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(ticket)) != -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
+ if (lstat(ticket, &st) != -1) {
+ if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
+ st.st_uid == uid)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving bad ticket for inspection. */
+ log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", ticket);
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+ cleanup_registered = 0;
+ xfree(ticket);
+ ticket = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb4(const char *server_user, KTEXT auth, char **client)
+{
+ AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
+ KTEXT_ST reply;
+ char instance[INST_SZ];
+ int r, s;
+ socklen_t slen;
+ u_int cksum;
+ Key_schedule schedule;
+ struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
+
+ s = packet_get_connection_in();
+
+ slen = sizeof(local);
+ memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
+ if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
+ debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ slen = sizeof(foreign);
+ memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
+ if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ instance[0] = '*';
+ instance[1] = 0;
+
+ /* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
+ if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance, 0, &adat, ""))) {
+ packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
+
+ *client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
+ (void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
+ *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
+
+ /* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
+ if (kuserok(&adat, (char *) server_user) != KSUCCESS) {
+ packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed!");
+ log("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to account %s",
+ *client, server_user);
+ xfree(*client);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
+ session key. */
+ cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
+ cksum = htonl(cksum);
+
+ /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
+ empty message, admitting our failure. */
+ if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
+ schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
+ packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ reply.dat[0] = 0;
+ reply.length = 0;
+ } else
+ reply.length = r;
+
+ /* Clear session key. */
+ memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
+
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
+ packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+
+#ifdef AFS
+int
+auth_kerberos_tgt(struct passwd *pw, const char *string)
+{
+ CREDENTIALS creds;
+
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+ if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
+ log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
+ packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
+ goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
+ }
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