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[src/trunk]: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist OpenSSH 8.1 was released on...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/a0c08292c65b
branches: trunk
changeset: 455270:a0c08292c65b
user: christos <christos%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Sat Oct 12 15:13:54 2019 +0000
description:
OpenSSH 8.1 was released on 2019-10-09. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html
Security
========
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): an exploitable integer
overflow bug was found in the private key parsing code for the XMSS
key type. This key type is still experimental and support for it is
not compiled by default. No user-facing autoconf option exists in
portable OpenSSH to enable it. This bug was found by Adam Zabrocki
and reported via SecuriTeam's SSD program.
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): add protection for private keys at
rest in RAM against speculation and memory side-channel attacks like
Spectre, Meltdown and Rambleed. This release encrypts private keys
when they are not in use with a symmetric key that is derived from a
relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB).
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with
an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible
with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is
overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").
diffstat:
crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig | 99 ++
crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp-realpath.c | 224 ++++++
crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sshsig.c | 799 +++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sshsig.h | 92 ++
4 files changed, 1214 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 1230 to 300 lines):
diff -r 40c6911d9234 -r a0c08292c65b crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.sshsig Sat Oct 12 15:13:54 2019 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format
+that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.
+
+At present, only detached and armored signatures are supported.
+
+1. Armored format
+
+The Armored SSH signatures consist of a header, a base64
+encoded blob, and a footer.
+
+The header is the string "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----"
+followed by a newline. The footer is the string
+"-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" immediately after a newline.
+
+The header MUST be present at the start of every signature.
+Files containing the signature MUST start with the header.
+Likewise, the footer MUST be present at the end of every
+signature.
+
+The base64 encoded blob SHOULD be broken up by newlines
+every 76 characters.
+
+Example:
+
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgJKxoLBJBivUPNTUJUSslQTt2hD
+jozKvHarKeN8uYFqgAAAADZm9vAAAAAAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKNC4IEbt
+Tq0Fb56xhtuE1/lK9H9RZJfON4o6hE9R4ZGFX98gy0+fFJ/1d2/RxnZky0Y7GojwrZkrHT
+FgCqVWAQ==
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
+
+2. Blob format
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+#define SIG_VERSION 0x01
+
+ byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+ uint32 SIG_VERSION
+ string publickey
+ string namespace
+ string reserved
+ string hash_algorithm
+ string signature
+
+The publickey field MUST contain the serialisation of the
+public key used to make the signature using the usual SSH
+encoding rules, i.e RFC4253, RFC5656,
+draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448, etc.
+
+Verifiers MUST reject signatures with versions greater than those
+they support.
+
+The purpose of the namespace value is to specify a unambiguous
+interpretation domain for the signature, e.g. file signing.
+This prevents cross-protocol attacks caused by signatures
+intended for one intended domain being accepted in another.
+The namespace value MUST NOT be the empty string.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+Data to be signed is first hashed with the specified hash_algorithm.
+This is done to limit the amount of data presented to the signature
+operation, which may be of concern if the signing key is held in limited
+or slow hardware or on a remote ssh-agent. The supported hash algorithms
+are "sha256" and "sha512".
+
+The signature itself is made using the SSH signature algorithm and
+encoding rules for the chosen key type. For RSA signatures, the
+signature algorithm must be "rsa-sha2-512" or "rsa-sha2-256" (i.e.
+not the legacy RSA-SHA1 "ssh-rsa").
+
+This blob is encoded as a string using the RFC4243 encoding
+rules and base64 encoded to form the middle part of the
+armored signature.
+
+
+3. Signed Data, of which the signature goes into the blob above
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+
+ byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+ string namespace
+ string reserved
+ string hash_algorithm
+ string H(message)
+
+The preamble is the six-byte sequence "SSHSIG". It is included to
+ensure that manual signatures can never be confused with any message
+signed during SSH user or host authentication.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+The data is concatenated and passed to the SSH signing
+function.
+
diff -r 40c6911d9234 -r a0c08292c65b crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp-realpath.c
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp-realpath.c Sat Oct 12 15:13:54 2019 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.1 2019/07/05 04:55:40 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik%iclub.nsu.ru@localhost>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
+# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
+#endif
+
+/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
+
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ char *p, *q, *s;
+ size_t left_len, resolved_len;
+ unsigned symlinks;
+ int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
+ char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (path[0] == '\0') {
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ serrno = errno;
+
+ if (resolved == NULL) {
+ resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
+ if (resolved == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ mem_allocated = 1;
+ } else
+ mem_allocated = 0;
+
+ symlinks = 0;
+ if (path[0] == '/') {
+ resolved[0] = '/';
+ resolved[1] = '\0';
+ if (path[1] == '\0')
+ return (resolved);
+ resolved_len = 1;
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
+ } else {
+ if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
+ if (mem_allocated)
+ free(resolved);
+ else
+ strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
+ }
+ if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate over path components in `left'.
+ */
+ while (left_len != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
+ * and its length.
+ */
+ p = strchr(left, '/');
+ s = p ? p : left + left_len;
+ if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
+ next_token[s - left] = '\0';
+ left_len -= s - left;
+ if (p != NULL)
+ memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
+ if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
+ if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
+ resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (next_token[0] == '\0')
+ continue;
+ else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
+ continue;
+ else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Strip the last path component except when we have
+ * single "/"
+ */
+ if (resolved_len > 1) {
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+ *q = '\0';
+ resolved_len = q - resolved;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
+ * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
+ * there are no more path components left.
+ */
+ resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
+ if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
+ errno = serrno;
+ return (resolved);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+ if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
+ errno = ELOOP;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
+ if (slen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ symlink[slen] = '\0';
+ if (symlink[0] == '/') {
+ resolved[1] = 0;
+ resolved_len = 1;
+ } else if (resolved_len > 1) {
+ /* Strip the last path component. */
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+ *q = '\0';
+ resolved_len = q - resolved;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there are any path components left, then
+ * append them to symlink. The result is placed
+ * in `left'.
+ */
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
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