Subject: Re: Stackghost in OpenBSD: buffer overflow protection
To: Darren Reed <avalon@cairo.anu.edu.au>
From: Mike Frantzen <frantzen@w4g.org>
List: port-sparc
Date: 09/21/2001 10:07:58
> At Usenix security symposium, one of the OpenBSD hacks (without a sense of
> humour, I might add)

I have been elevatated to the status of "OpenBSD hack".  My mommy will
be so proud.  Lol.

> Aside from Casper Dik telling the guy how register windows worked during
> question time,

I was answering with sparcv8 and had talked to Casper a few hours before
about sparcv9.   To be honest, I still don't have a firm understanding
of the nuances of the nestible traps on v9.  But my stackghost
implementation is v8.  A seperate code path (or at least a diverging
one) is required to differentiate between kernel windows and user
windows on v8 (need to validate the users' stack pages).  If all that
extra code had to be added to v9, the performance penalty for mucking
with the users' stack wouldn't be so negligible.  But I digress.

> it seems like a generally good idea.  Does one of the sparc
> gurus here want to review for adoption in NetBSD ?  I'd have a go at it
> but it is messing with stuff that I know others are better prepared to
> deal with.

Somewhere I have some initial work on making ptrace and core analysis
deal with the hashed return pointer on the stack.  I'd be more than
happy to collaberate (especially if I don't have to go back into the
stinky pit of despair called GDB)

.mike