On Thu, Jun 01, 2000 at 03:21:31PM -0400, Curt Sampson wrote:
> On Thu, 1 Jun 2000, Jon Lindgren wrote:
> 
> > To have a
> > keystroke essentially disable the NVRAM security seems a bit contradictory
> > to me... but I can't argue with the facts.
> 
> No, it's reasonable. You can't do this on a serial console, so if you're
> making these keystrokes, you've got physical access to the machine. At
> that point, it's compromised no matter what you do. You can always just
> open it up and pop in a new NVRAM chip, or steal or replace the drive,
> or whatever.

The kerboard/display can be available when the UC is in a locked room close to
it (you can have up to 10 meters between the UC and console).

--
Manuel Bouyer <bouyer@antioche.eu.org>
--