In message <Pine.NEB.4.21.0010171019040.9256-100000@glamdring.siterock.com>, Gr
ey Wolf writes:
>On Tue, 17 Oct 2000, Bill Sommerfeld wrote:
>
># the solution for this belongs in getty, not in the user's (untrusted)
># shell.
># 
># 						- Bill
>
>Only on locally connected terminals where they're hardwired and
>their type is known, i.e., the console or something connected to ttya/
>tty01/whatever...
>
>For me, the clearing of a screen at logout time is a nicety, not
>a necessity.  That said, I did put the clear sequences into /etc/gettytab
>for the Pc3 and suncons entries (Sun Consoles use ^L, BTW, but \e[2J would
>work there too).

Right, which brings up the question of what the threat model is.  That 
is, what harm are you trying to prevent by clearing the screen?  Is it 
the user's own data?  Then something in .profile or .login should 
suffice, since they wouldn't be trying to subvert it.  System data?  
Much less likely to be an issue for non-hardwired terminals, I'd guess. 
And for hardwired ones, something in getty (or getty via gettytab) will 
suffice.


		--Steve Bellovin