>Number:         1543
>Category:       misc
>Synopsis:       bdes(1) contains (now false) information
>Confidential:   no
>Severity:       serious
>Priority:       low
>Responsible:    misc-bug-people (Misc Bug People)
>State:          open
>Class:          doc-bug
>Submitter-Id:   net
>Arrival-Date:   Fri Sep 29 02:35:02 1995
>Last-Modified:
>Originator:     Bill Sommerfeld
>Organization:
	
>Release:        950927
>Environment:
	
System: NetBSD orchard.medford.ma.us 1.0A NetBSD 1.0A (ORCHARD) #2: Mon Sep 25 23:26:59 EDT 1995 sommerfe@orchard.medford.ma.us:/u1/jsys/sys/arch/i386/compile/ORCHARD i386


>Description:

The following paragraph is quite dated:

       The DES is considered  a  very  strong  cryptosystem,  and
       other  than  table lookup attacks, key search attacks, and
       Hellman's time-memory tradeoff  (all  of  which  are  very
       expensive  and  time-consuming),  no cryptanalytic methods
       for breaking the DES are known in the open literature.  No
       doubt  the  choice  of  keys and key security are the most
       vulnerable aspect of bdes.


>How-To-Repeat:
	N/A
>Fix:
	Talk to a cryptographer :-).

	DES is no longer considered "very strong"; there are a number of 
	known cryptanalytic attacks which aren't particularly practical,
	but the 56-bit keyspace is vulnerable to exhaustive search.

>Audit-Trail:
>Unformatted: