On 7 Sep 1999, Chris G. Demetriou wrote:

# If the process calls:
# 
(any uid/gid setting function)
# 
# successfully, or sets user or group ID on exec, the P_SUGID flag is
# set.  (it is cleared only on non-set-id exec.)  If P_SUGID is set, the
# process won't dump core.  So, set-id programs are safe.
# 
# I'd say that this inherited attribute -- as well as other attributes
# which should exist and be inherited, such as unaligned access handling
# -- should revert to their system-wide defaults upon set-id exec (and
# maybe anything that sets P_SUGID, but i'm less sure about that).
# 
# Obviously, these attributes don't exist yet, so code to reset them or
# otherwise properly handle them can't exist yet.  8-)

So you're thinking that login now has to change its uid, and exec
something that execs the user's login shell.  This means that a user's
login shell will not dump a core unless we jump through this hoop.

Pardon me for saying so, but it looks like we're adding hoops we don't
need to add.



# 
# > At the very least, I'd suggest a little bit of thought about this before
# > it gets entrenched enough that when bugs are found workarounds need to be
# > invented, instead of just yanking the mechanism.
# 
# yah.
# 
# 
# 
# cgd
# -- 
# Chris Demetriou - cgd@netbsd.org - http://www.netbsd.org/People/Pages/cgd.html
# Disclaimer: Not speaking for NetBSD, just expressing my own opinion.
# 


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