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Re: NetBSD Security Advisory 2011-005: ISC dhclient hostname field shell metacharacter injection
On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 10:12:11AM +0700, Robert Elz wrote:
> There is no reason to limit (at all - with the possible exception of \0
> which just makes things messy for unix) the values that appear in
> hostnames (nor the set that a DHCP server can deliver, for that matter).
> Scripts (or other applications) that break when the hostname is unusual
> ought to be fixed, not pandered to.
Someone needs to tell ISC then - BIND has been, by default, rejecting
names with _ in them for years.
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