Re: cgd and remote keys

[David Brownlee <abs%NetBSD.org@localhost>]

On Sat, 5 Jan 2008, Gavan Fantom wrote:

> Possibly a better strategy would be for cgd (or something similar) to support 
> multiple keys for the same partition, and return alternative datasets 
> depending on which key is given. Plausible deniability tends to work much 
> better when under duress than not being in a position to give anything. If 
> you can give them something that is sufficient to convince them that they 
> have got everything there is to get from you, and that it will be of some 
> value to them, then you are more likely to escape with your life (or without 
> a criminal record).
>
> In the case of criminals, presumably some slightly secret information that 
> you would plausibly encrypt (while the ultra-secret stuff is encrypted with 
> an auto-destructed key, of which no trace exists). In the case of law 
> enforcement, presumably some softcore porn or details of swiss bank accounts 
> which contain trivial amounts of money. Basically, enough to warrant hiding 
> it from prying eyes, but not enough to get you into deep trouble.
>
> Then there is no way to prove that you have any more keys, and you can deny 
> it to your heart's content.

        TrueCrypt allows for nesting a hidden volume inside a normally
        encrypted volume. A trivial implementation of this would not
        interact well with an FFS outer encrypted volume, but could
        definitely be a good approach for those interested:

        http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=hidden-volume
        http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability

--
                David/absolute       -- www.NetBSD.org: No hype required --