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    >> There is a talk being presented at MIT today that shows clearly
    >> that 1Kb public keys can be factored fairly easily on cheap
    >> custom hardware.  It is long past time for SSH keys to be at
    >> least 2Kb by default.
 
John Gilmore suggested that 2048 is the wrong number. One should add
~100 to that number.  

The concept being, if someone builds a machine that can crack 2048-bit
numbers, it won't be able to do 2049-ones. A machine that can do 2049
may well be able to 4096. So, you get the brute-force resistance of 4096
(in terms of $$$ to build) without the cost. 

This is not a technical argument -- it is an economic one.

- -- 
]       ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine.           |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
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