Thus spake Thor Lancelot Simon ("TLS> ") sometime Today...

TLS> I'm concerned that removing all knowledge of the disklabel structure from
TLS> the kernel will ultimately result in a situation in which it's impossible
TLS> to enforce the restrictions on partition access used to protect the TCB
TLS> when running at securelevel > 0.

I would strongly agree with this...

TLS> In fact, I tend to think that _all_ disklabel access should be
TLS> mediated by the kernel, using a suitably abstracted interface, and
TLS> that access to the label sectors should be explicitly forbidden to
TLS> all userland programs.

All accesses or just write access?  Disallowing reading seems a bit OTT,
just on general principle.

				--*greywolf;
--
NetBSD: Agnostics in the Platform Religious Wars.