Subject: Re: BSD Auth for NetBSD
To: Jason Thorpe <>
From: Greg A. Woods <>
List: tech-security
Date: 09/13/2003 13:23:02
[ On Saturday, September 13, 2003 at 00:07:49 (-0700), Jason Thorpe wrote: ]
> Subject: Re: BSD auth for AFS
> But you've over-simplified the problem.  Sure, you're suggesting a 
> solution for this *one specific case*.  But you are NOT solving the 
> general problem, which is that BSD Auth is fundamentally incapable of 
> modifying the context of the process requesting the authentication, 
> which is a capability that is sometimes necessary and which PAM has.

I've not solved the problem because I don't want to.  In fact by
definition and by design I _must_ NOT sovle that problem.  It really is
a feature of BSD Auth to force the authenticator to run in a separate
context.  It's a "VERY Good Thing(tm)"!  Solving that problem would take
away the major distinguishing feature of BSD Auth (and the one I believe
primarily responsible for it being so clean, simple, small, and elegant).

Besides, anything that must be done to the caller's process context (or
address space), _can_ be done, _but_ it MUST be done in a controlled way
by proxy of the BSD Auth interface.  That's the whole idea.

						Greg A. Woods

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