Newsgroups:
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2002 17:38:44 -0400 (EDT)
From: pgreen <polytarp@m-net.arbornet.org>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
cc: Michael W Mitton <mmitton@hmcon.com>,  <freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG>,
     <tech-security@netbsd.org>,  <misc@openbsd.org>
Subject: Re: 1024 bit key considered insecure (sshd)
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In-Reply-To: <87lm6onqj2.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <20020830173221.S54273@m-net.arbornet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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What I'm thinking, is that we need a solution based on real fact.  Even a
normal high-school kid could see that this isn't scientific atol.  What
I'm suggesting:  something based on universal rhetoric.

What does this mean?  Well, I think some formulae should do the trick of
explaining it:

	8 ** x
	----
        \
         \
         /       sin(6 ** x) * ( 4 5 6    -  ( 5 4 5)
        /                        8 2 5 )
        ----

	(define square (x)
		(+ x x x)
		(square (x))
	)

I think this prooves my point.
It is a non-rhetorical system of encryption.
Will we still rely on the old system?
	I think not.

On 30 Aug 2002, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

>
> Michael W Mitton <mmitton@hmcon.com> writes:
> > My data may not be worth a billion dollars, but I can be fairly certain
> > that I am part of a group ( a rather _large_ group ) whose combined
> > information is worth that.
>
> The combination is not of much importance because the combination
> doesn't share a single key. A machine can only crack so many keys per
> unit time. If you build a device that costs you a billion dollars and
> can only crack one key every six months, you are going to to be very
> careful about which key you choose to crack because each key costs you
> hundreds of millions in amortized cost to crack.
>
> > Beside, I'm sure the federal government ( any federal government )
> > wouldn't blink an eye at 1 billion dollars if they could read everyones
> > email.  ;)
>
> Again, at best this offers you the THEORETICAL possibility of reading
> any particular individual's mail. You still have to spend huge
> resources on cracking that one key, assuming that this is even
> possible. (The jury is still out on that.) There is a distinction
> between saying that one can crack ANYONE'S key and saying you can
> crack EVERYONE'S key. One implies being able to break a few if you
> really really want to, the other implies being able to break all
> cheaply and quickly.
>
> I would like to repeat that using longer key lengths is not
> necessarily stupid -- just not something to be contemplated as an
> imminent emergency. Certainly the jury is still out on just how
> practical factoring 1024 bit numbers is using the latest algorithms
> and hardware acceleration.
>
>
> --
> Perry E. Metzger		perry@piermont.com
> --
> "Ask not what your country can force other people to do for you..."
>
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