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-----Original Message-----
From: matthew green <mrg@ETERNA.COM.AU>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG <BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG>
Date: Friday, May 21, 1999 11:37 AM
Subject: NetBSD Security Advisory 1999-010


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>
>                 NetBSD Security Advisory 1999-010
>                 =================================
>
>Topic: ARP table vulnerability
>Version: NetBSD-1.3*
>Severity: Denial of service or traffic hijacking from local network
> cable is possible
>
>
>Abstract
>========
>
>The implementation of ARP packet reception is vulnerable two attacks:
>
> - on multihomed hosts, ARP packets from cable A can overwrite
>   ARP entries for cable B.
>
> - for all hosts, ARP packets can overwrite ARP entries marked
>   as static.
>
>
>Technical Details
>=================
>
>ARP is a protocol used to dynamically obtain IPv4 to Link level address
>translation, used for Ethernet, FDDI, Token ring, and ARCnet cables,
>described in RFC 826.
>
>The first vulnerability is specific to hosts with more than one ARP capable
>network attached.  The address information of incoming ARP packets is not
>checked to ensure that it corresponds to one of the addresses of the
>interface on which the packet arrived.  Thus, it would be able to suppress
>or redirect traffic from the attacked host to a different destination.
>
>The second vulnerability is related to so-called "static" arp entries.
>The original NetBSD ARP implementation (as that of most other vendors)
>allows the creation of "static" or "permanent" ARP entries.  They are
>typically used for two reasons:
>
> - as a security measure, to disallow the redirection of traffic
>   addressed to priviledged hosts by rogue hosts on the cable to
>   themselves or elsewhere,
>
> - as a cheap routing protocol ("proxy ARP"), mostly when
>   connecting single hosts through point to point links.  To the
>   outside, they occur as if they where on the (e.g.) Ethernet, but
>   traffic destined for them is redirected by the ARP mechanism to
>   the routing host.
>
>The 2nd usage doesn't create specific denial of service possibilities as
>the ARP protocol is insecure in itself.
>
>However, if static ARP entries are used to prevent D.O.S. attacks, they
need
>to be protected from overwriting.
>
>
>Solutions and Workarounds
>=========================
>
>NetBSD-1.4, and NetBSD-1.4_BETA after 1999-05-05, are fixed.
>
>A patch is available for NetBSD 1.3.3 to fix this problem.  You may
>find this patch on the NetBSD ftp server:
>
>    ftp://ftp.NetBSD.ORG/pub/NetBSD/misc/security/patches/19990505-arp
>
>
>NetBSD-current since 19990506 is not vulnerable.  Users of
>NetBSD-current should upgrade to a source tree later than 19990506.
>
>
>
>Thanks To
>=========
>
>Both vulnerabilities were reported by Olaf "Rhialto" Seibert in NetBSD
>PR 7489 and PR 7490.  A fix was provided by Zdenek Salvet in PR 7497,
>and integrated into NetBSD by Ignatios Souvatzis.
>
>
>Revision History
>================
>
> 1999/05/21 - initial version
>
>
>More Information
>================
>
>Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
>http://www.NetBSD.ORG/ and http://www.NetBSD.ORG/Security/.
>
>
>Copyright 1999, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
>
>$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA1999-010.txt,v 1.3 1999/05/21 12:47:00 mrg Exp $
>
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