Subject: Re: random ip_id must be configurable
To: None <jonathan@DSG.Stanford.EDU>
From: Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino <email@example.com>
Date: 09/12/2003 07:24:50
> I can only conclude that you did not adequately review the code you
> committed, because it does not mention fragmentation attacks; But it
> *does* explicitly mention "the resolver/named problem".
what is "it" in "it does not mention"? i don't understand what you are
trying to mean.
> Can I ask just why you are committing code to the NetBSD tree without
> adequate review, and in the face of a prior consensus *against*
> forcing 15-bit linear-congruential randomized IP_IDs?
when is the "prior consensus"? maybe that's before i joined.
> As for preventing fragmmentation attacks: this change is neither
> necessary nor sufficient. I've mentioned a better approach (for which
> I have a working, shipped implementation) here tha said, on this list.
reference please? where can i see the code?
> Itujun, that's really reaching. I'm looking for a responsive,
> well-reasoned, technical argument to support making randomized IDs the
> default. If this is the best you can offer, you're not helping your case.
i don't understand why you don't know about this very commonly-known
issue, and i don't understand why do i have to prove it is a problem
to make it into netbsd tree. i can't leave netbsd in an insecure
state (predictable ip_id). my mission as a developer is to make it
better protected against potential attacks. is it enough?
or, if you would like your system be insecure, make a local change
to use predictable ip_id and use the system. don't forbid me from
making netbsd general distribution more secure.