Re: RFC: New security model secmodel_securechroot(9)

[Jean-Yves Migeon <jeanyves.migeon%free.fr@localhost>]

On 09.07.2011 20:08, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> However, I'd like to see a different system call used to enter the chroot
> in this case, so that it's possible to have a normal, less-restricted
> chroot at the same time.

IMHO that will defeat its purpose: programs will have to get patched to
call some sort of securechroot(2). Everything outside of base (or
patched pkg) won't benefit from it.

In case it gets turned into a syscall, I would suggest a
"security.models.securechroot.override" that would override chroot(2)
confinement rules and make securechroot(2) == chroot(2). Override may be
explicitly turned off in specific circumstances (like kernel tables
manipulation for a chroot'ed process), but this would have an impact on
the whole system.

Ideally, this would have to be specified on a per executable basis (like
PaX flags), but heh... wishful thinking.

More buttons, levers, knobs.

-- 
Jean-Yves Migeon
jeanyves.migeon%free.fr@localhost