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Re: extended attributes
On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 03:52:17PM +0000, Emmanuel Dreyfus wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 09:30:40AM -0500, Eric Haszlakiewicz wrote:
> > eh? Don't corrupted filesystems cause a panic anyway? What is it about
> > extended attributes that makes this more likely?
> You rarely write to the executable files that you need in order to boot
> to single user, but modifying attribute backing stores is a common
> operation. This makes the later more susceptible to being corrupted at
> the time the filesystem is mounted.
I don't really understand. Modifying the attribute backing stores is
subject to the same constraints as any other metadata write -- isn't it?
Is there somehow less protection against corruption here than there
would be when, for example, modifying the _inode_ for a given executable?
Shouldn't that operation be considerably _more_ common than modifying
the attributes for a given executable?
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