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On Fri, Nov 09, 2001 at 11:34:04AM -0800, Wolfgang Rupprecht wrote:
> Would pushing the "would-be entropy" through a crypto-system make it
> non-predictable enough to prevent such attacks?  Eg. if the
> inter-arrival time of packets was used to fill up an entropy pool and
> the fear was that someone could stuff the pool with known data then
> could running all the data through des/blowfish etc in some chained
> feedback mode put a real crimp in their style? =20

Neat idea. But isn't the point of passively collecting entropy for
/dev/random that it's passive? I mean, running all that passively
collected data through blowfish is going to cost you some
processor... and a significant percentage of processor on slower
machines (many of which we support).

--=20
       ~ g r @ eclipsed.net

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