Subject: Re: Sysctls vs. securelevel (was Re: Volunteers to test some kernel
To: None <email@example.com>
From: der Mouse <mouse@Rodents.Montreal.QC.CA>
Date: 06/15/1999 10:55:38
>> Just to clarify, I meant that you could not (by any means) make a
>> file executable while the system is running at whatever secure-level
>> turns your feature on and you clear execute permissions when a file
>> is written to.
> This brings up an interesting point. We probably should take
> features like this and make them one-way sysctls, so that there isn't
> too much assumed about what's in a `securelevel'.
Thank you. Something had been bothering me about this, and now that
you mention it, this is it: way too much is getting rolled into a
single securelevel setting. Maybe I want a couple of features from a
high securelevel without some others that kick in at a lower
> In fact, I'd venture to suggest that much of the current
> `securelevel' functionality would be better implemented by sysctls
> that are one-way settings (reset only at reboot).
> Or, there could be a `securelevel' with exactly two states (0 and 1),
> where `0' indicates two-way security switch sysctls, and `1'
> indicates one-way settings.
...and of course kern.security.securelevel would itself be one-way
(arguably with the exception of init, though if init has any special
rights, it should also be immune to ptrace() and moral equivalents).
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