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[src/netbsd-8]: src/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5 Pull up following revision(s)...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/24ed9ed27bf0
branches: netbsd-8
changeset: 376558:24ed9ed27bf0
user: martin <martin%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Wed Jun 21 22:04:13 2023 +0000
description:
Pull up following revision(s) (requested by riastradh in ticket #1844):
lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.c: revision 1.31
lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.8: revision 1.13
pam_krb5: Refuse to operate without a key to verify tickets.
New allow_kdc_spoof overrides this to restore previous behaviour
which was vulnerable to KDC spoofing, because without a host or
service key, pam_krb5 can't distinguish the legitimate KDC from a
spoofed one.
This way, having pam_krb5 enabled isn't dangerous even if you create
an empty /etc/krb5.conf to use client SSO without any host services.
Perhaps this should use krb5_verify_init_creds(3) instead, and
thereby respect the rather obscurely named krb5.conf option
verify_ap_req_nofail like the Linux pam_krb5 does, but:
- verify_ap_req_nofail is default-off (i.e., vulnerable by default),
- changing verify_ap_req_nofail to default-on would probably affect
more things and therefore be riskier,
- allow_kdc_spoof is a much clearer way to spell the idea,
- this patch is a smaller semantic change and thus less risky, and
- a security change with compatibility issues shouldn't have a
workaround that might introduce potentially worse security issues
or more compatibility issues.
Perhaps this should use krb5_verify_user(3) with secure=1 instead,
for simplicity, but it's not clear how to do that without first
prompting for the password -- which we shouldn't do at all if we
later decide we won't be able to use it anyway -- and without
repeating a bunch of the logic here anyway to pick the service name.
References about verify_ap_req_nofail:
- mit-krb5 discussion about verify_ap_req_nofail:
https://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2011-January/009778.html
- Oracle has the default-secure setting in their krb5 system:
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26505_01/html/E27224/setup-148.html
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26505_01/html/816-5174/krb5.conf-4.html#REFMAN4krb5.conf-4
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19253-01/816-4557/gihyu/
- Heimdal issue on verify_ap_req_nofail default:
https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues/1129
diffstat:
lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.8 | 17 +++-
lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.c | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 303 to 300 lines):
diff -r eff644f8d891 -r 24ed9ed27bf0 lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.8
--- a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.8 Wed Jun 21 21:50:34 2023 +0000
+++ b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.8 Wed Jun 21 22:04:13 2023 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $NetBSD: pam_krb5.8,v 1.11 2008/12/02 22:52:06 reed Exp $
+.\" $NetBSD: pam_krb5.8,v 1.11.40.1 2023/06/21 22:04:13 martin Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD: src/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.8,v 1.6 2001/11/24 23:41:32 dd Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) Frank Cusack, 1999-2001. All rights reserved.
@@ -142,6 +142,21 @@ and
.Ql %p ,
to designate the current process ID; can be used in
.Ar name .
+.It Cm allow_kdc_spoof
+Allow
+.Nm
+to succeed even if there is no host or service key available in a
+keytab to authenticate the Kerberos KDC's ticket.
+If there is no such key, for example on a host with no keytabs,
+.Nm
+will fail immediately without prompting the user.
+.Pp
+.Sy Warning :
+If the host has not been configured with a keytab from the KDC, setting
+this option makes it vulnerable to malicious KDCs, e.g. via DNS
+flooding, because
+.Nm
+has no way to distinguish the legitimate KDC from a spoofed KDC.
.El
.Ss Kerberos 5 Account Management Module
The Kerberos 5 account management component
diff -r eff644f8d891 -r 24ed9ed27bf0 lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.c
--- a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.c Wed Jun 21 21:50:34 2023 +0000
+++ b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.c Wed Jun 21 22:04:13 2023 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $NetBSD: pam_krb5.c,v 1.26 2013/12/28 18:04:03 christos Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: pam_krb5.c,v 1.26.18.1 2023/06/21 22:04:13 martin Exp $ */
/*-
* This pam_krb5 module contains code that is:
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: src/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.c,v 1.22 2005/01/24 16:49:50 rwatson Exp $");
#else
-__RCSID("$NetBSD: pam_krb5.c,v 1.26 2013/12/28 18:04:03 christos Exp $");
+__RCSID("$NetBSD: pam_krb5.c,v 1.26.18.1 2023/06/21 22:04:13 martin Exp $");
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
@@ -85,7 +85,12 @@
static void log_krb5(krb5_context, krb5_error_code, struct syslog_data *,
const char *, ...) __printflike(4, 5);
-static int verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, char *, int);
+static int verify_krb_v5_tgt_begin(krb5_context, char *, int,
+ const char **, krb5_principal *, char[static BUFSIZ], struct syslog_data *);
+static int verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, char *, int,
+ const char *, krb5_principal, char[static BUFSIZ], struct syslog_data *);
+static void verify_krb_v5_tgt_cleanup(krb5_context, int,
+ const char *, krb5_principal, char[static BUFSIZ], struct syslog_data *);
static void cleanup_cache(pam_handle_t *, void *, int);
static const char *compat_princ_component(krb5_context, krb5_principal, int);
static void compat_free_data_contents(krb5_context, krb5_data *);
@@ -100,6 +105,7 @@ static void compat_free_data_contents(kr
#define PAM_OPT_RENEWABLE "renewable"
#define PAM_OPT_NO_CCACHE "no_ccache"
#define PAM_OPT_REUSE_CCACHE "reuse_ccache"
+#define PAM_OPT_ALLOW_KDC_SPOOF "allow_kdc_spoof"
/*
* authentication management
@@ -110,6 +116,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh,
{
krb5_error_code krbret;
krb5_context pam_context;
+ int debug;
+ const char *auth_service;
+ krb5_principal auth_princ;
+ char auth_phost[BUFSIZ];
+ struct syslog_data auth_data = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
krb5_creds creds;
krb5_principal princ;
krb5_ccache ccache;
@@ -144,18 +155,46 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh,
PAM_LOG("Got service: %s", (const char *)service);
+ if ((srvdup = strdup(service)) == NULL) {
+ retval = PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ goto cleanup6;
+ }
+
krbret = krb5_init_context(&pam_context);
if (krbret != 0) {
PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("Kerberos 5 error");
- return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+ retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto cleanup5;
}
PAM_LOG("Context initialised");
+ debug = openpam_get_option(pamh, PAM_OPT_DEBUG) ? 1 : 0;
+ krbret = verify_krb_v5_tgt_begin(pam_context, srvdup, debug,
+ &auth_service, &auth_princ, auth_phost, &auth_data);
+ if (krbret != 0) { /* failed to find key */
+ /* Keytab or service key does not exist */
+ if (debug)
+ log_krb5(pam_context, krbret, &auth_data,
+ "pam_krb5: verify_krb_v5_tgt: "
+ "krb5_kt_read_service_key");
+ /*
+ * Give up now because we can't authenticate the KDC
+ * with a keytab, unless the administrator asked to
+ * have the traditional behaviour of being vulnerable
+ * to spoofed KDCs.
+ */
+ if (!openpam_get_option(pamh, PAM_OPT_ALLOW_KDC_SPOOF)) {
+ retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto cleanup4;
+ }
+ }
+
krbret = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(pam_context, &opts);
if (krbret != 0) {
PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("Kerberos 5 error");
- return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+ retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto cleanup4;
}
if (openpam_get_option(pamh, PAM_OPT_FORWARDABLE))
@@ -299,12 +338,9 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh,
PAM_LOG("Credentials stashed");
/* Verify them */
- if ((srvdup = strdup(service)) == NULL) {
- retval = PAM_BUF_ERR;
- goto cleanup;
- }
krbret = verify_krb_v5_tgt(pam_context, ccache, srvdup,
- openpam_get_option(pamh, PAM_OPT_DEBUG) ? 1 : 0);
+ debug,
+ auth_service, auth_princ, auth_phost, &auth_data);
free(srvdup);
if (krbret == -1) {
PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("Kerberos 5 error");
@@ -354,11 +390,16 @@ cleanup3:
if (opts)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(pam_context, opts);
+cleanup4:
+ verify_krb_v5_tgt_cleanup(pam_context, debug,
+ auth_service, auth_princ, auth_phost, &auth_data);
krb5_free_context(pam_context);
+cleanup5:
+ free(srvdup);
- PAM_LOG("Done cleanup3");
-
+ PAM_LOG("Done cleanup5");
+cleanup6:
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("Kerberos 5 refuses you");
@@ -884,26 +925,24 @@ log_krb5(krb5_context ctx, krb5_error_co
* the local keytab doesn't have it), and we cannot find another
* service we do have, let her in.
*
- * Returns 1 for confirmation, -1 for failure, 0 for uncertainty.
+ * - verify_krb_v5_tgt_begin returns a krb5 error code.
+ * - verify_krb_v5_tgt returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache ccache,
- char *pam_service, int debug)
+verify_krb_v5_tgt_begin(krb5_context context, char *pam_service, int debug,
+ const char **servicep, krb5_principal *princp, char phost[static BUFSIZ],
+ struct syslog_data *datap)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal princ;
krb5_keyblock *keyblock;
- krb5_data packet;
- krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
- char phost[BUFSIZ];
const char *services[3], **service;
- struct syslog_data data = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
- packet.data = 0;
+ *servicep = NULL;
if (debug)
- openlog_r("pam_krb5", LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV, &data);
+ openlog_r("pam_krb5", LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV, datap);
/* If possible we want to try and verify the ticket we have
* received against a keytab. We will try multiple service
@@ -923,11 +962,11 @@ verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context context,
retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, NULL, *service,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &princ);
if (retval != 0 && debug)
- log_krb5(context, retval, &data,
+ log_krb5(context, retval, datap,
"pam_krb5: verify_krb_v5_tgt: "
"krb5_sname_to_principal");
if (retval != 0)
- return -1;
+ return (retval);
/* Extract the name directly. */
strncpy(phost, compat_princ_component(context, princ, 1),
@@ -945,21 +984,30 @@ verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context context,
continue;
break;
}
- if (retval != 0) { /* failed to find key */
- /* Keytab or service key does not exist */
- if (debug)
- log_krb5(context, retval, &data,
- "pam_krb5: verify_krb_v5_tgt: "
- "krb5_kt_read_service_key");
- retval = 0;
- goto cleanup;
- }
if (keyblock)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, keyblock);
+ return (retval);
+}
+
+static int
+verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache ccache,
+ char *pam_service, int debug,
+ const char *service, krb5_principal princ, char phost[static BUFSIZ],
+ struct syslog_data *datap)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+ krb5_data packet;
+
+ if (service == NULL)
+ return (0); /* uncertain, can't authenticate KDC */
+
+ packet.data = 0;
+
/* Talk to the kdc and construct the ticket. */
auth_context = NULL;
- retval = krb5_mk_req(context, &auth_context, 0, *service, phost,
+ retval = krb5_mk_req(context, &auth_context, 0, service, phost,
NULL, ccache, &packet);
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
@@ -967,7 +1015,7 @@ verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context context,
}
if (retval) {
if (debug)
- log_krb5(context, retval, &data,
+ log_krb5(context, retval, datap,
"pam_krb5: verify_krb_v5_tgt: "
"krb5_mk_req");
retval = -1;
@@ -979,7 +1027,7 @@ verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context context,
NULL, NULL);
if (retval) {
if (debug)
- log_krb5(context, retval, &data,
+ log_krb5(context, retval, datap,
"pam_krb5: verify_krb_v5_tgt: "
"krb5_rd_req");
retval = -1;
@@ -988,16 +1036,25 @@ verify_krb_v5_tgt(krb5_context context,
retval = 1;
cleanup:
- if (debug)
- closelog_r(&data);
if (packet.data)
compat_free_data_contents(context, &packet);
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
auth_context = NULL; /* setup for rd_req */
}
- krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
- return retval;
+ return (retval);
+}
+
+static void
+verify_krb_v5_tgt_cleanup(krb5_context context, int debug,
+ const char *service, krb5_principal princ, char phost[static BUFSIZ],
+ struct syslog_data *datap)
+{
+
+ if (service)
+ krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
+ if (debug)
+ closelog_r(datap);
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