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[src/trunk]: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist merge conflicts
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/bef646ff5673
branches: trunk
changeset: 345029:bef646ff5673
user: christos <christos%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
description:
merge conflicts
diffstat:
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES | 97 +++++++++++++++++
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile | 2 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS | 13 ++
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README | 2 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c | 36 ++++-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_type.c | 2 -
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | 2 -
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c | 2 -
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/Makefile | 8 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c | 2 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslv.h | 6 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/openssl.spec | 2 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_both.c | 2 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/s2_lib.c | 16 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 2 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_lib.c | 88 +++++++-------
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl.h | 4 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 16 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_locl.h | 3 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/t1_lib.c | 6 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/mk1mf.pl | 9 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/mkdef.pl | 6 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/ssleay.num | 6 +-
23 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 1037 to 300 lines):
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -2,6 +2,103 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.1s and 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]
+
+ *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+
+ A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+ when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+ AES-NI.
+
+ This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+ attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
+ constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+ compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+ checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+ bytes.
+
+ This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+ (CVE-2016-2107)
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+ Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+ amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+ corruption.
+
+ Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by
+ the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+ OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+ from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+ vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+ with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2105)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+ resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+ internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+ forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+ the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+ specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+ therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+ one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+ internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+ Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+ of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+ instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2106)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+
+ When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+ a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory
+ potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+
+ Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+ affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+ Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+ applications are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2016-2109)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) EBCDIC overread
+
+ ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+ using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+ in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2176)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ [Todd Short]
+
+ *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
+ default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+ methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
Changes between 1.0.1r and 1.0.1s [1 Mar 2016]
* Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.1s
+VERSION=1.0.1t
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.1
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1s and OpenSSL 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]
+
+ o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)
+ o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105)
+ o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106)
+ o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109)
+ o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176)
+ o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from
+ the default.
+ o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option.
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1r and OpenSSL 1.0.1s [1 Mar 2016]
o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.1s 1 Mar 2016
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1t 3 May 2016
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@
#endif
#define HEADER_SIZE 8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
{
BUF_MEM *b;
@@ -217,29 +218,44 @@
/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
want = c.slen;
if (want > (len - off)) {
+ size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
want -= (len - off);
if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
len + want < len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
while (want > 0) {
- i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
- if (i <= 0) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
- ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+ /*
+ * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+ * so we can return an error for EOF without
+ * having to allocate the entire content length
+ * in one go.
+ */
+ size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ want -= chunk;
+ while (chunk > 0) {
+ i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+ ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* This can't overflow because |len+want| didn't
* overflow.
*/
- len += i;
- want -= i;
+ len += i;
+ chunk -= i;
+ }
+ if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+ chunk_max *= 2;
}
}
if (off + c.slen < off) {
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_type.c Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_type.c Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -126,9 +126,7 @@
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -903,9 +903,7 @@
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
goto err;
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -611,9 +611,7 @@
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
/*
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/Makefile
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/Makefile Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/Makefile Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@
e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
e_aes.o: ../modes/modes_lcl.h e_aes.c evp_locl.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/aes.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -212,8 +212,8 @@
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
-e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: evp_locl.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o: e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c evp_locl.h
e_bf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
- if (i + inl < bl) {
+ if (bl - i > inl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
ctx->buf_len += inl;
*outl = 0;
diff -r 76b9a4389070 -r bef646ff5673 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslv.h
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslv.h Tue May 03 17:21:02 2016 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslv.h Tue May 03 17:21:32 2016 +0000
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
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