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[src/trunk]: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist Upstream changelog:
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/c76cebf96069
branches: trunk
changeset: 331381:c76cebf96069
user: spz <spz%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
description:
Upstream changelog:
Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
*) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
g, A, B < N to SRP code.
Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for discovering this issue.
(CVE-2014-3512)
[Steve Henson]
*) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3511)
[David Benjamin]
*) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
Thanks to Felix Gr??bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3510)
[Emilia K??sper]
*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3507)
[Adam Langley]
*) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3506)
[Adam Langley]
*) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
this issue.
(CVE-2014-3505)
[Adam Langley]
*) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3509)
[Gabor Tyukasz]
*) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam?ki (Codenomicon) for
discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-5139)
[Steve Henson]
*) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
output to the attacker.
Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
(CVE-2014-3508)
[Emilia K??sper, and Steve Henson]
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
[Bodo Moeller]
diffstat:
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES | 86 ++++++++++++++++
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/FAQ | 5 -
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile | 6 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS | 13 ++
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README | 2 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/apps.c | 4 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/ciphers.c | 6 -
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/crl2p7.c | 8 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/enc.c | 8 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.h | 8 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.pl | 2 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_object.c | 30 +++-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c | 24 +++-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c | 7 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c | 3 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c | 12 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c | 3 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl | 3 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c | 6 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c | 2 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c | 7 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c | 1 +
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c | 4 +-
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/openssl.spec | 2 +-
24 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 608 to 300 lines):
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CHANGES Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -2,6 +2,92 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+ *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+ SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+ g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+
+ Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+ Group for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3512)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+ TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+ is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+ downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+ higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
+
+ Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+ researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3511)
+ [David Benjamin]
+
+ *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+ to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+ with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+ ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3510)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+ to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3507)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+ processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3506)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+ whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+ can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+ this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3505)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+ session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+ up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+
+ Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3509)
+ [Gabor Tyukasz]
+
+ *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+ dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+ properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
+ discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-5139)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+ X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+ from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+ output to the attacker.
+
+ Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3508)
+ [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
*) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/FAQ
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/FAQ Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/FAQ Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -113,11 +113,6 @@
documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
directory.
-For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
-might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
-predecessor, at <URL: http://www.columbia.edu/~ariel/ssleay/>. Much
-of this still applies to OpenSSL.
-
There is some documentation about certificate extensions and PKCS#12
in doc/openssl.txt
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.1h
+VERSION=1.0.1i
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.1
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
SHLIB_EXT=
PLATFORM=dist
-OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
+OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist
SHLIB_TARGET=
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
CC= cc
CFLAG= -O
-DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE
+DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
PEX_LIBS=
EX_LIBS=
EXE_EXT=
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/NEWS Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -5,10 +5,23 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3512
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3511
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3509
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-5139
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/README Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.1h 5 Jun 2014
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1i 6 Aug 2014
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/apps.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/apps.c Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/apps.c Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@
{
arg->count=20;
arg->data=(char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *)*arg->count);
+ if (arg->data == NULL)
+ return 0;
}
for (i=0; i<arg->count; i++)
arg->data[i]=NULL;
@@ -1542,6 +1544,8 @@
len=strlen(t)+strlen(OPENSSL_CONF)+2;
p=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return NULL;
BUF_strlcpy(p,t,len);
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
BUF_strlcat(p,"/",len);
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/ciphers.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/ciphers.c Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/ciphers.c Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -96,13 +96,7 @@
char buf[512];
BIO *STDout=NULL;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
- meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
- meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#endif
apps_startup();
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/crl2p7.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/crl2p7.c Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/crl2p7.c Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -141,7 +141,13 @@
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
if(!certflst) certflst = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv));
+ if (!certflst)
+ goto end;
+ if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv)))
+ {
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(certflst);
+ goto end;
+ }
}
else
{
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/enc.c
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/enc.c Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/enc.c Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
#include <ctype.h>
int set_hex(char *in,unsigned char *out,int size);
@@ -337,6 +339,12 @@
goto end;
}
+ if (cipher && (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphers in XTS mode are not supported by the enc utility\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
if (md && (dgst=EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s is an unsupported message digest type\n",md);
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.h
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.h Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.h Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -107,16 +107,16 @@
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"gendsa",gendsa_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"genpkey",genpkey_main},
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_server",s_server_main},
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_client",s_client_main},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SPEED
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"speed",speed_main},
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_time",s_time_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"version",version_main},
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"crl2pkcs7",crl2pkcs7_main},
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"sess_id",sess_id_main},
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ciphers",ciphers_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"nseq",nseq_main},
diff -r cabbe40ff244 -r c76cebf96069 crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.pl
--- a/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.pl Sun Aug 10 07:09:51 2014 +0000
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/progs.pl Sun Aug 10 07:32:44 2014 +0000
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
push(@files,$_);
$str="\t{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,\"$_\",${_}_main},\n";
if (($_ =~ /^s_/) || ($_ =~ /^ciphers$/))
- { print "#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))\n${str}#endif\n"; }
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