CVS commit: pkgsrc/security/openssh

["Maya Rashish" <maya%netbsd.org@localhost>]

Module Name:    pkgsrc
Committed By:   maya
Date:           Wed May  1 17:59:56 UTC 2019

Modified Files:
        pkgsrc/security/openssh: Makefile distinfo
        pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches: patch-auth.c patch-config.h.in
            patch-configure.ac patch-loginrec.c patch-sshd.c
Removed Files:
        pkgsrc/security/openssh: MESSAGE.Interix
        pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches: patch-auth-passwd.c
            patch-auth-rhosts.c patch-auth2.c patch-includes.h
            patch-openbsd-compat_bsd-openpty.c patch-platform.c patch-scp.c
            patch-session.c patch-sftp-common.c patch-sshpty.c patch-uidswap.c

Log Message:
openssh: update to 8.0p1

Update provided by Aleksej Lebedev in pkgsrc-wip.

I removed Interix support. We've been moving the patches for a
while, without a real test on Interix. the support for interix
is quite invasive and makes updating this package difficult.

Will reconsider re-adding if I knew we had actual users on
Interix (I strongly suspect we don't).

OpenSSH 8.0 was released on 2019-04-17. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Security
========

This release contains mitigation for a weakness in the scp(1) tool
and protocol (CVE-2019-6111): when copying files from a remote system
to a local directory, scp(1) did not verify that the filenames that
the server sent matched those requested by the client. This could
allow a hostile server to create or clobber unexpected local files
with attacker-controlled content.

This release adds client-side checking that the filenames sent from
the server match the command-line request,

The scp protocol is outdated, inflexible and not readily fixed. We
recommend the use of more modern protocols like sftp and rsync for
file transfer instead.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * scp(1): Relating to the above changes to scp(1); the scp protocol
   relies on the remote shell for wildcard expansion, so there is no
   infallible way for the client's wildcard matching to perfectly
   reflect the server's. If there is a difference between client and
   server wildcard expansion, the client may refuse files from the
   server. For this reason, we have provided a new "-T" flag to scp
   that disables these client-side checks at the risk of
   reintroducing the attack described above.

 * sshd(8): Remove support for obsolete "host/port" syntax. Slash-
   separated host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to
   host:port syntax for the benefit of IPv6 users. These days there
   are establised standards for this like [::1]:22 and the slash
   syntax is easily mistaken for CIDR notation, which OpenSSH
   supports for some things. Remove the slash notation from
   ListenAddress and PermitOpen; bz#2335

Changes since OpenSSH 7.9
=========================

This release is focused on new features and internal refactoring.

New Features
------------

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-add(1): Add support for ECDSA keys in
   PKCS#11 tokens.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add experimental quantum-computing resistant
   key exchange method, based on a combination of Streamlined NTRU
   Prime 4591^761 and X25519.

 * ssh-keygen(1): Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits,
   following NIST Special Publication 800-57's guidance for a
   128-bit equivalent symmetric security level.

 * ssh(1): Allow "PKCS11Provider=none" to override later instances of
   the PKCS11Provider directive in ssh_config; bz#2974

 * sshd(8): Add a log message for situations where a connection is
   dropped for attempting to run a command but a sshd_config
   ForceCommand=internal-sftp restriction is in effect; bz#2960

 * ssh(1): When prompting whether to record a new host key, accept
   the key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes". This allows the user
   to paste a fingerprint obtained out of band at the prompt and
   have the client do the comparison for you.

 * ssh-keygen(1): When signing multiple certificates on a single
   command-line invocation, allow automatically incrementing the
   certificate serial number.

 * scp(1), sftp(1): Accept -J option as an alias to ProxyJump on
   the scp and sftp command-lines.

 * ssh-agent(1), ssh-pkcs11-helper(8), ssh-add(1): Accept "-v"
   command-line flags to increase the verbosity of output; pass
   verbose flags though to subprocesses, such as ssh-pkcs11-helper
   started from ssh-agent.

 * ssh-add(1): Add a "-T" option to allowing testing whether keys in
   an agent are usable by performing a signature and a verification.

 * sftp-server(8): Add a "lsetstat%openssh.com@localhost" protocol extension
   that replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT
   operation but does not follow symlinks. bz#2067

 * sftp(1): Add "-h" flag to chown/chgrp/chmod commands to request
   they do not follow symlinks.

 * sshd(8): Expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment. This makes
   the connection 4-tuple available to PAM modules that wish to use
   it in decision-making. bz#2741

 * sshd(8): Add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate Matches in same
   pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require hostname
   canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906

 * sftp(1): Support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch
   commands; bz#2926

 * ssh-keygen(1): When printing certificate contents using
   "ssh-keygen -Lf /path/certificate", include the algorithm that
   the CA used to sign the cert.

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): Fix authentication failures when sshd_config contains
   "AuthenticationMethods any" inside a Match block that overrides
   a more restrictive default.

 * sshd(8): Avoid sending duplicate keepalives when ClientAliveCount
   is enabled.

 * sshd(8): Fix two race conditions related to SIGHUP daemon restart.
   Remnant file descriptors in recently-forked child processes could
   block the parent sshd's attempt to listen(2) to the configured
   addresses. Also, the restarting parent sshd could exit before any
   child processes that were awaiting their re-execution state had
   completed reading it, leaving them in a fallback path.

 * ssh(1): Fix stdout potentially being redirected to /dev/null when
   ProxyCommand=- was in use.

 * sshd(8): Avoid sending SIGPIPE to child processes if they attempt
   to write to stderr after their parent processes have exited;
   bz#2071

 * ssh(1): Fix bad interaction between the ssh_config ConnectTimeout
   and ConnectionAttempts directives - connection attempts after the
   first were ignoring the requested timeout; bz#2918

 * ssh-keyscan(1): Return a non-zero exit status if no keys were
   found; bz#2903

 * scp(1): Sanitize scp filenames to allow UTF-8 characters without
   terminal control sequences;  bz#2434

 * sshd(8): Fix confusion between ClientAliveInterval and time-based
   RekeyLimit that could cause connections to be incorrectly closed.
   bz#2757

 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): Correct some bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN
   handling at initial token login. The attempt to read the PIN
   could be skipped in some cases, particularly on devices with
   integrated PIN readers. This would lead to an inability to
   retrieve keys from these tokens. bz#2652

 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): Support keys on PKCS#11 tokens that set the
   CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE flag by requring a fresh login after the
   C_SignInit operation. bz#2638

 * ssh(1): Improve documentation for ProxyJump/-J, clarifying that
   local configuration does not apply to jump hosts.

 * ssh-keygen(1): Clarify manual - ssh-keygen -e only writes
   public keys, not private.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): be more strict in processing protocol banners,
   allowing \r characters only immediately before \n.

 * Various: fix a number of memory leaks, including bz#2942 and
   bz#2938

 * scp(1), sftp(1): fix calculation of initial bandwidth limits.
   Account for bytes written before the timer starts and adjust the
   schedule on which recalculations are performed. Avoids an initial
   burst of traffic and yields more accurate bandwidth limits;
   bz#2927

 * sshd(8): Only consider the ext-info-c extension during the initial
   key eschange. It shouldn't be sent in subsequent ones, but if it
   is present we should ignore it. This prevents sshd from sending a
   SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy these clients. bz#2929

 * ssh-keygen(1): Clarify manual that ssh-keygen -F (find host in
   authorized_keys) and -R (remove host from authorized_keys) options
   may accept either a bare hostname or a [hostname]:port combo.
   bz#2935

 * ssh(1): Don't attempt to connect to empty SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#2936

 * sshd(8): Silence error messages when sshd fails to load some of
   the default host keys. Failure to load an explicitly-configured
   hostkey is still an error, and failure to load any host key is
   still fatal. pr/103

 * ssh(1): Redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh is
   started with ControlPersist; prevents random ProxyCommand output
   from interfering with session output.

 * ssh(1): The ssh client was keeping a redundant ssh-agent socket
   (leftover from authentication) around for the life of the
   connection; bz#2912

 * sshd(8): Fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
   PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types
   were specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys
   as the monitor checks only the base key (not the signature
   algorithm) type against *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746

 * ssh(1): Request correct signature types from ssh-agent when
   certificate keys and RSA-SHA2 signatures are in use.

Portability
-----------

 * sshd(8): On Cygwin, run as SYSTEM where possible, using S4U for
   token creation if it supports MsV1_0 S4U Logon.

 * sshd(8): On Cygwin, use custom user/group matching code that
   respects the OS' behaviour of case-insensitive matching.

 * sshd(8): Don't set $MAIL if UsePAM=yes as PAM typically specifies
   the user environment if it's enabled; bz#2937

 * sshd(8) Cygwin: Change service name to cygsshd to avoid collision
   with Microsoft's OpenSSH port.

 * Allow building against OpenSSL -dev (3.x)

 * Fix a number of build problems against version configurations and
   versions of OpenSSL. Including bz#2931 and bz#2921

 * Improve warnings in cygwin service setup. bz#2922

 * Remove hardcoded service name in cygwin setup. bz#2922


To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.1 -r0 pkgsrc/security/openssh/MESSAGE.Interix
cvs rdiff -u -r1.258 -r1.259 pkgsrc/security/openssh/Makefile
cvs rdiff -u -r1.106 -r1.107 pkgsrc/security/openssh/distinfo
cvs rdiff -u -r1.5 -r0 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c \
    pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-platform.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.3 -r0 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-rhosts.c \
    pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshpty.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.4 -r1.5 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.7 -r0 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth2.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.6 -r1.7 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-config.h.in
cvs rdiff -u -r1.7 -r1.8 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac
cvs rdiff -u -r1.4 -r0 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-includes.h \
    pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_bsd-openpty.c \
    pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-scp.c \
    pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sftp-common.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.5 -r1.6 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.9 -r0 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-session.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.10 -r1.11 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.6 -r0 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-uidswap.c

Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.

Modified files:

Index: pkgsrc/security/openssh/Makefile
diff -u pkgsrc/security/openssh/Makefile:1.258 pkgsrc/security/openssh/Makefile:1.259
--- pkgsrc/security/openssh/Makefile:1.258      Thu Apr 25 14:55:04 2019
+++ pkgsrc/security/openssh/Makefile    Wed May  1 17:59:56 2019
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.258 2019/04/25 14:55:04 tron Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.259 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
 
-DISTNAME=              openssh-7.9p1
+DISTNAME=              openssh-8.0p1
 PKGNAME=               ${DISTNAME:S/p1/.1/}
 PKGREVISION=           1
 CATEGORIES=            security
@@ -36,33 +36,12 @@ INSTALL_TARGET=             install-nokeys
 # fixes: dyld: Symbol not found: _allow_severity
 CONFIGURE_ARGS.Darwin+=        --disable-strip
 
-# OpenSSH on Interix has some important caveats
-.if ${OPSYS} == "Interix"
-MESSAGE_SRC=           ${.CURDIR}/MESSAGE.Interix
-BUILDLINK_PASSTHRU_DIRS+= /usr/local/lib/bind
-CONFIGURE_ENV+=                ac_cv_func_openpty=no
-CONFIGURE_ENV+=                ac_cv_type_struct_timespec=yes
-CPPFLAGS+=             -DIOV_MAX=16 # default is INT_MAX, way too large
-.  if exists(/usr/local/include/bind/resolv.h)
-CPPFLAGS+=             -I/usr/local/include/bind
-BUILDLINK_PASSTHRU_DIRS+= /usr/local/include/bind
-.  elif exists(/usr/local/bind/include/resolv.h)
-CPPFLAGS+=             -I/usr/local/bind/include
-BUILDLINK_PASSTHRU_DIRS+= /usr/local/bind/include
-.  endif
-LDFLAGS+=              -L/usr/local/lib/bind
-LIBS+=                 -lbind -ldb -lcrypt
-
-.else # not Interix
-
 PKG_GROUPS=            ${OPENSSH_GROUP}
 PKG_USERS=             ${OPENSSH_USER}:${OPENSSH_GROUP}
 
 PKG_GECOS.${OPENSSH_USER}=     sshd privsep pseudo-user
 PKG_HOME.${OPENSSH_USER}=      ${OPENSSH_CHROOT}
 
-.endif
-
 SSH_PID_DIR=           ${VARBASE}/run  # default directory for PID files
 
 PKG_SYSCONFSUBDIR=     ssh
@@ -73,10 +52,8 @@ CONFIGURE_ARGS+=     --sysconfdir=${PKG_SYSC
 CONFIGURE_ARGS+=       --with-pid-dir=${SSH_PID_DIR}
 CONFIGURE_ARGS+=       --with-tcp-wrappers=${BUILDLINK_PREFIX.tcp_wrappers}
 
-.if ${OPSYS} != "Interix"
 CONFIGURE_ARGS+=       --with-privsep-path=${OPENSSH_CHROOT:Q}
 CONFIGURE_ARGS+=       --with-privsep-user=${OPENSSH_USER}
-.endif
 
 # pkgsrc already enforces a "secure" version of zlib via dependencies,
 # so skip this bogus version check.

Index: pkgsrc/security/openssh/distinfo
diff -u pkgsrc/security/openssh/distinfo:1.106 pkgsrc/security/openssh/distinfo:1.107
--- pkgsrc/security/openssh/distinfo:1.106      Fri Jan 18 20:13:36 2019
+++ pkgsrc/security/openssh/distinfo    Wed May  1 17:59:56 2019
@@ -1,29 +1,18 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.106 2019/01/18 20:13:36 tnn Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.107 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
 
-SHA1 (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = 993aceedea8ecabb1d0dd7293508a361891c4eaa
-RMD160 (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = 236617fb9c04dcca12f9d56b5975efda4e798f53
-SHA512 (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = 0412c9c429c9287f0794023951469c8e6ec833cdb55821bfa0300dd90d0879ff60484f620cffd93372641ab69bf0b032c2d700ccc680950892725fb631b7708e
-Size (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = 1565384 bytes
+SHA1 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = 756dbb99193f9541c9206a667eaa27b0fa184a4f
+RMD160 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = 9c0d0d97a5f9f97329bf334725dfbad53576d612
+SHA512 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = e280fa2d56f550efd37c5d2477670326261aa8b94d991f9eb17aad90e0c6c9c939efa90fe87d33260d0f709485cb05c379f0fd1bd44fc0d5190298b6398c9982
+Size (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = 1597697 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-Makefile.in) = 13502b825c13c98b2ba3b84ff4bae9aa664b76b1
-SHA1 (patch-auth-passwd.c) = f2906091185c84d0dbb26e6b8fa0de30934816bd
-SHA1 (patch-auth-rhosts.c) = a5e6131e63b83a7e8a06cd80f22def449d6bc2c4
-SHA1 (patch-auth.c) = cd13f8b31b45d668c5e09eca098b17ec8a7c1039
-SHA1 (patch-auth2.c) = c57e5fe3d6fed73e6b26a8e4e4c63f36d8e20535
+SHA1 (patch-auth.c) = 194e3293fdc18b93014041d379d57df172716e1c
 SHA1 (patch-clientloop.c) = 4e88fbd14db33f003eb93c30c682a017e102196e
-SHA1 (patch-config.h.in) = 926507ea281568e06385e16cbd3c8b907f2baa3f
-SHA1 (patch-configure.ac) = c8ee9d49a4989c5dfe02a89e0d3a8a4e16c32b9d
+SHA1 (patch-config.h.in) = 7d1050743da7264763254b57938775c546c3baa5
+SHA1 (patch-configure.ac) = 321ef5ed83abe7e07d38026e096a10700b010ac8
 SHA1 (patch-defines.h) = bd8687a9a2857f3b8d15ae94095f27f9344003c4
-SHA1 (patch-includes.h) = c4a7622af6fbcd098d18d257724dca6aaeea4fda
-SHA1 (patch-loginrec.c) = 28082deb14258fe63cbecad8ac96afc016de439c
-SHA1 (patch-openbsd-compat_bsd-openpty.c) = 80e076a18a0f9ba211ecd4bc5853ce01899568ae
+SHA1 (patch-loginrec.c) = 76f1e03182cbd18dd9ac0bdfcb6502eec7eb56a9
 SHA1 (patch-openbsd-compat_openbsd-compat.h) = bedbede16ab2fe918419c994ba15a20167b411b4
 SHA1 (patch-openbsd-compat_port-tun.c) = 4b1b55b7fdc319e011d249ee336301b17a589228
-SHA1 (patch-platform.c) = f8f211dbc5e596c0f82eb86324d18a84c6151ec5
 SHA1 (patch-sandbox-darwin.c) = c9a1fe2e4dbf98e929d983b4206a244e0e354b75
-SHA1 (patch-scp.c) = 9c2317b0f796641903a826db355ba06595a26ea1
-SHA1 (patch-session.c) = 2538d6f825bff1be325207285cdfac89f73ff264
-SHA1 (patch-sftp-common.c) = 6819aa040c8f1caa30a704cf6f0588e498df8778
 SHA1 (patch-sshd.8) = 5bf48cd27cef8e8810b9dc7115f5180102a345d1
-SHA1 (patch-sshd.c) = 1944283a09772f767044e46acf5329bfad5dae3c
-SHA1 (patch-sshpty.c) = cb691d4fbde808927f2fbcc12b87ad983cf21938
-SHA1 (patch-uidswap.c) = 6c68624cfd6ff3c2386008ff336c4d7da78195f4
+SHA1 (patch-sshd.c) = 825eeec13608859852f4cfdeaceedce21bd2f164

Index: pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth.c
diff -u pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth.c:1.4 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth.c:1.5
--- pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth.c:1.4    Mon Jan 18 12:53:26 2016
+++ pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth.c        Wed May  1 17:59:56 2019
@@ -1,27 +1,17 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-auth.c,v 1.4 2016/01/18 12:53:26 jperkin Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-auth.c,v 1.5 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
 
-* Replace uid 0 with ROOTUID macro.
 * Use login_getpwclass() instead of login_getclass() so that the root
   vs. default login class distinction is made correctly, from FrrrBSD's
   ports.
 
---- auth.c.orig        2015-08-21 04:49:03.000000000 +0000
+--- auth.c.orig        2019-05-01 11:28:52.028281617 +0000
 +++ auth.c
-@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw
-               user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
-               if (options.strict_modes &&
-                   (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
--                  ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-+                  ((st.st_uid != ROOTUID && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-                   (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-                       logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
-                           "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
-@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
-       if (!allowed_user(pw))
+@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+       if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
                return (NULL);
  #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 -      if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
-+      if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
++      if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
                debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
                return (NULL);
        }

Index: pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-config.h.in
diff -u pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-config.h.in:1.6 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-config.h.in:1.7
--- pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-config.h.in:1.6       Fri Jan 18 20:13:37 2019
+++ pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-config.h.in   Wed May  1 17:59:56 2019
@@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-config.h.in,v 1.6 2019/01/18 20:13:37 tnn Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-config.h.in,v 1.7 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
 
-* Added Interix and define new path to if_tun.h.
+* define new path to if_tun.h.
 * Revive tcp_wrappers support.
 
 --- config.h.in.orig   2018-10-19 01:06:33.000000000 +0000
 +++ config.h.in
-@@ -741,6 +741,9 @@
- /* define if you have int64_t data type */
- #undef HAVE_INT64_T
- 
-+/* Define if you are on Interix */
-+#undef HAVE_INTERIX
-+
- /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
- #undef HAVE_INTMAX_T
- 
 @@ -910,6 +913,9 @@
  /* Define to 1 if you have the <net/route.h> header file. */
  #undef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H

Index: pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac
diff -u pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac:1.7 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac:1.8
--- pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac:1.7      Fri Jan 18 20:13:37 2019
+++ pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac  Wed May  1 17:59:56 2019
@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.7 2019/01/18 20:13:37 tnn Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.8 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
 
-* Various fixes regarding portability
-* Revive tcp_wrappers support.
-
---- configure.ac.orig  2018-10-17 00:01:20.000000000 +0000
+--- configure.ac.orig  2019-04-17 22:52:57.000000000 +0000
 +++ configure.ac
-@@ -293,6 +293,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
+@@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
        ]
  )
  
@@ -15,7 +12,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.7 2019/0
  # Allow user to specify flags
  AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
        [  --with-cflags           Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
-@@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
+@@ -387,6 +390,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
        maillock.h \
        ndir.h \
        net/if_tun.h \
@@ -23,23 +20,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.7 2019/0
        netdb.h \
        netgroup.h \
        pam/pam_appl.h \
-@@ -736,6 +740,15 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
-               ;;
-       esac
-       ;;
-+*-*-interix*)
-+        AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INTERIX)
-+        AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
-+        AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-+        AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
-+        AC_DEFINE(MISSING_HOWMANY)
-+        AC_DEFINE(NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT)
-+        AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
-+        ;;
- *-*-irix5*)
-       PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
-       AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1],
-@@ -1493,6 +1506,62 @@ else
+@@ -1494,6 +1507,62 @@ else
        AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
  fi
  
@@ -102,7 +83,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.7 2019/0
  # Check whether user wants to use ldns
  LDNS_MSG="no"
  AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
-@@ -5189,9 +5258,17 @@ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+@@ -5129,9 +5198,17 @@ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
  ])
  if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
        if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
@@ -122,7 +103,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.7 2019/0
        AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
                [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
  fi
-@@ -5283,7 +5360,7 @@ echo "OpenSSH has been configured with t
+@@ -5223,7 +5300,7 @@ echo "OpenSSH has been configured with t
  echo "                     User binaries: $B"
  echo "                   System binaries: $C"
  echo "               Configuration files: $D"
@@ -131,7 +112,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.7 2019/0
  echo "                      Manual pages: $F"
  echo "                          PID file: $G"
  echo "  Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
-@@ -5305,6 +5382,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support
+@@ -5245,6 +5322,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support
  echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
  echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
  echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"

Index: pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c
diff -u pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c:1.5 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c:1.6
--- pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c:1.5        Mon Jan 18 12:53:26 2016
+++ pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-loginrec.c    Wed May  1 17:59:56 2019
@@ -1,20 +1,12 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-loginrec.c,v 1.5 2016/01/18 12:53:26 jperkin Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-loginrec.c,v 1.6 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
 
-Interix support and related fixes. Fix build on FreeBSD.
+Interix support and related fixes.
+Fix build on FreeBSD.
+
+XXX remove interix once we figure out which one's which
 
 --- loginrec.c.orig    2015-08-21 04:49:03.000000000 +0000
 +++ loginrec.c
-@@ -432,8 +432,8 @@ login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, con
- int
- login_write(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
--      if (geteuid() != 0) {
-+#if !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(HAVE_INTERIX)
-+        if (geteuid() != ROOTUID) {
-               logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
-               return (1);
-       }
 @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
  
        /* set the timestamp */

Index: pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c
diff -u pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c:1.10 pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c:1.11
--- pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c:1.10   Fri Jan 18 20:13:37 2019
+++ pkgsrc/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c        Wed May  1 17:59:56 2019
@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-sshd.c,v 1.10 2019/01/18 20:13:37 tnn Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-sshd.c,v 1.11 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
 
-* Interix support
-* Revive tcp_wrappers support.
-
---- sshd.c.orig        2018-10-17 00:01:20.000000000 +0000
+--- sshd.c.orig        2019-04-17 22:52:57.000000000 +0000
 +++ sshd.c
 @@ -123,6 +123,13 @@
  #include "version.h"
@@ -19,35 +16,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-sshd.c,v 1.10 2019/01/18 
  /* Re-exec fds */
  #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD  (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
  #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD                (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
-@@ -225,7 +232,11 @@ int *startup_pipes = NULL;
- int startup_pipe;             /* in child */
- 
- /* variables used for privilege separation */
-+#ifdef HAVE_INTERIX
-+int use_privsep = 0;
-+#else
- int use_privsep = -1;
-+#endif
- struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
- int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
- static int privsep_chroot = 1;
-@@ -556,10 +567,15 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
-               /* Drop our privileges */
-               debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
-                   (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
-+#ifdef HAVE_INTERIX
-+      if (setuser(privsep_pw->pw_name, NULL, SU_COMPLETE))
-+              fatal("setuser: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-+#else
-               gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
-               if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
-                       fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-               permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
-+#endif /* HAVE_INTERIX */
-       }
- }
- 
-@@ -623,10 +639,17 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -534,10 +541,17 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
                /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
                set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
  
@@ -65,57 +34,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-sshd.c,v 1.10 2019/01/18 
  
                return 0;
        }
-@@ -638,7 +661,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
-       if (1) {
- #else
--      if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
-+      if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == ROOTUID) {
- #endif
-               /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
-               use_privsep = 0;
-@@ -1504,8 +1527,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-       av = saved_argv;
- #endif
- 
--      if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
-+#ifndef HAVE_INTERIX
-+      if (geteuid() == ROOTUID && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
-               debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
-+#endif
- 
-       /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
-       sanitise_stdfd();
-@@ -1730,7 +1755,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-       );
- 
-       /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
--      privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
-+      privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == ROOTUID || geteuid() == ROOTUID);
-       if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
-               if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication)
-                       fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
-@@ -1871,7 +1896,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-                   (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
-                   (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
- #else
--              if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
-+              if (st.st_uid != ROOTUID || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
- #endif
-                       fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
-                           "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
-@@ -1899,8 +1924,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-        * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
-        * module which might be used).
-        */
-+#ifndef HAVE_INTERIX
-       if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
-               debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
-+#endif
- 
-       if (rexec_flag) {
-               if (rexec_argc < 0)
-@@ -2093,6 +2120,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -2053,6 +2067,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
        audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
  #endif
  
@@ -123,7 +42,7 @@ $NetBSD: patch-sshd.c,v 1.10 2019/01/18 
 +      allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
 +      deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
 +      /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
-+      if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
++      if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
 +              struct request_info req;
 +
 +              request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);