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CVS commit: pkgsrc/sysutils
Module Name: pkgsrc
Committed By: bouyer
Date: Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 UTC 2017
Modified Files:
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48: MESSAGE Makefile distinfo
pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48: Makefile distinfo
Added Files:
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches: patch-XSA231 patch-XSA232
patch-XSA234 patch-XSA237 patch-XSA238 patch-XSA239 patch-XSA240
patch-XSA241 patch-XSA242 patch-XSA243 patch-XSA244
pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches: patch-XSA233 patch-XSA240
Removed Files:
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches: patch-XSA-212
pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches: patch-XSA-211-1 patch-XSA-211-2
Log Message:
Update xentools48 and xenkernel48 to 4.8.2, and apply security patches up
to XSA244. Keep PKGREVISION to 1 to account for the fact that it's
not a stock Xen 4.8.2.
Note that, unlike upstream, pv-linear-pt defaults to true, so that
NetBSD PV guests (including dom0) will continue to boot without changes
to boot.cfg
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.1 -r1.2 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE
cvs rdiff -u -r1.5 -r1.6 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile
cvs rdiff -u -r1.2 -r1.3 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo
cvs rdiff -u -r1.1 -r0 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA-212
cvs rdiff -u -r0 -r1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244
cvs rdiff -u -r1.7 -r1.8 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile
cvs rdiff -u -r1.3 -r1.4 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo
cvs rdiff -u -r1.1 -r0 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA-211-1 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA-211-2
cvs rdiff -u -r0 -r1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233 \
pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
Modified files:
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE
diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE:1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE:1.2
--- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE:1.1 Thu Mar 30 09:15:09 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/MESSAGE Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
===========================================================================
-$NetBSD: MESSAGE,v 1.1 2017/03/30 09:15:09 bouyer Exp $
+$NetBSD: MESSAGE,v 1.2 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
The Xen hypervisor is installed under the following locations:
${XENKERNELDIR}/xen.gz (standard hypervisor)
${XENKERNELDIR}/xen-debug.gz (debug hypervisor)
+
+Note that unlike upstream Xen, pv-linear-pt defaults to true.
+You can disable it using pv-linear-pt=false on the Xen command line,
+but then you can't boot NetBSD in PV mode.
===========================================================================
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile
diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile:1.5 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile:1.6
--- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile:1.5 Mon Jul 24 08:53:45 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/Makefile Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/07/24 08:53:45 maya Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.6 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
-VERSION= 4.8.0
+VERSION= 4.8.2
DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION}
PKGNAME= xenkernel48-${VERSION}
PKGREVISION= 1
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo
diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo:1.2 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo:1.3
--- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo:1.2 Sat Apr 8 12:30:42 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/distinfo Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -1,11 +1,21 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.2 2017/04/08 12:30:42 spz Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.3 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
-SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = c2403899b13e1e8b8da391aceecbfc932d583a88
-RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = b79b1e2587caa9c6fe68d2996a4fd42f95c1fe7b
-SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 70b95553f9813573b12e52999a4df8701dec430f23c36a8dc70d25a46bb4bc9234e5b7feb74a04062af4c8d6b6bcfe947d90b2b172416206812e54bac9797454
-Size (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 22499917 bytes
+SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 184c57ce9e71e34b3cbdd318524021f44946efbe
+RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = f4126cb0f7ff427ed7d20ce399dcd1077c599343
+SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 7805531f73d23ecfff3439770e62d387f4254a444875670d53a0a739323e5d4d8f8fcc478f8936ee1ae8aff3e0229549e47c01c606365a8ce060dd5c503e87da
+Size (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 22522336 bytes
SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = abf55aa58792315e758ee3785a763cfa8c2da68f
-SHA1 (patch-XSA-212) = 4637d51bcbb3b11fb0e22940f824ebacdaa15b4f
+SHA1 (patch-XSA231) = fc249a68ea53064ff7d95f24380f66f3fc3393e7
+SHA1 (patch-XSA232) = 86d633941ac3165ca4034db660a48d60384ea252
+SHA1 (patch-XSA234) = acf4170a410d9f314c0cc0c5c092db6bb6cc69a0
+SHA1 (patch-XSA237) = 3125554b155bd650480934a37d89d1a7471dfb20
+SHA1 (patch-XSA238) = 58b6fcb73d314d7f06256ed3769210e49197aa90
+SHA1 (patch-XSA239) = 10619718e8a1536a7f52eb3838cdb490e6ba8c97
+SHA1 (patch-XSA240) = dca90d33d30167edbe07071795f18159e3e20c57
+SHA1 (patch-XSA241) = b506425ca7382190435df6f96800cb0a24aff23e
+SHA1 (patch-XSA242) = afff314771d78ee2482aec3b7693c12bfe00e0ec
+SHA1 (patch-XSA243) = 75eef49628bc0b3bd4fe8b023cb2da75928103a7
+SHA1 (patch-XSA244) = 2739ff8a920630088853a9076f71ca2caf639320
SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = be3f4577a205b23187b91319f91c50720919f70b
SHA1 (patch-xen_Rules.mk) = 5f33a667bae67c85d997a968c0f8b014b707d13c
SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = e2d148fb308c37c047ca41a678471217b6166977
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile
diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile:1.7 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile:1.8
--- pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile:1.7 Fri Sep 8 09:51:25 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/Makefile Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2017/09/08 09:51:25 jaapb Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
#
-VERSION= 4.8.0
+VERSION= 4.8.2
VERSION_IPXE= 827dd1bfee67daa683935ce65316f7e0f057fe1c
DIST_IPXE= ipxe-git-${VERSION_IPXE}.tar.gz
DIST_NEWLIB= newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ DIST_LIBPCI= pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2
DIST_SUBDIR= xen48
DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION}
PKGNAME= xentools48-${VERSION}
-PKGREVISION= 3
+PKGREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= sysutils
MASTER_SITES= https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${VERSION}/
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo
diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo:1.3 pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo:1.4
--- pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo:1.3 Wed Aug 23 03:02:14 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/distinfo Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.3 2017/08/23 03:02:14 maya Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.4 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
SHA1 (xen48/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2) = c011e8feaf1bb89158bd55eaabd7ef8fdd101a2c
RMD160 (xen48/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2) = a8f3f41501ece290c348aeb4444bbea40bc53e71
@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ SHA1 (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) =
RMD160 (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) = ded71632d316126138f2db4a5f2051b2489ae5ff
SHA512 (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) = 4928b5b82f57645be9408362706ff2c4d9baa635b21b0d41b1c82930e8c60a759b1ea4fa74d7e6c7cae1b7692d006aa5cb72df0c3b88bf049779aa2b566f9d35
Size (xen48/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz) = 214145 bytes
-SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = c2403899b13e1e8b8da391aceecbfc932d583a88
-RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = b79b1e2587caa9c6fe68d2996a4fd42f95c1fe7b
-SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 70b95553f9813573b12e52999a4df8701dec430f23c36a8dc70d25a46bb4bc9234e5b7feb74a04062af4c8d6b6bcfe947d90b2b172416206812e54bac9797454
-Size (xen48/xen-4.8.0.tar.gz) = 22499917 bytes
+SHA1 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 184c57ce9e71e34b3cbdd318524021f44946efbe
+RMD160 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = f4126cb0f7ff427ed7d20ce399dcd1077c599343
+SHA512 (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 7805531f73d23ecfff3439770e62d387f4254a444875670d53a0a739323e5d4d8f8fcc478f8936ee1ae8aff3e0229549e47c01c606365a8ce060dd5c503e87da
+Size (xen48/xen-4.8.2.tar.gz) = 22522336 bytes
SHA1 (xen48/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 60faeaaf250642db5c0ea36cd6dcc9f99c8f3902
RMD160 (xen48/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 89a57e336c24f7f6eebda3a1724e14b71187e117
SHA512 (xen48/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ SHA1 (patch-.._newlib-1.16.0_newlib_libc
SHA1 (patch-._stubdom_vtpmmgr_tpm2_marshal.h) = 30c747a53e848387e4c8d6f4dcbcab7d1b46ed12
SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = 7976ce94c553c2fc6badc6d41e9cb8334fea40c8
SHA1 (patch-Makefile) = fdcd5fbb22613e55ac1b000a46b1ecbbd99eef59
-SHA1 (patch-XSA-211-1) = df96b8992148e442a887715ccca741b948fbb0f5
-SHA1 (patch-XSA-211-2) = c860da3631c1c7988f9bb150020935859c6b061f
+SHA1 (patch-XSA233) = e6a7230035966d7d292ef3ca477f2eb3458ae12f
+SHA1 (patch-XSA240) = 754bbe5080a81e1526b7938fed01ba435e65e50b
SHA1 (patch-docs_man_xl.cfg.pod.5.in) = e1ee6f2d48f6ce001c44c7ac688ea179b625b584
SHA1 (patch-docs_man_xl.conf.pod.5) = d77e3313750db315d540d7713c95cd54d6f02938
SHA1 (patch-docs_man_xl.pod.1.in) = 9b37ef724f2827bc05110e5456a8668257509cab
Added files:
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA231 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA231,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Subject: xen/mm: make sure node is less than MAX_NUMNODES
+
+The output of MEMF_get_node(memflags) can be as large as nodeid_t can
+hold (currently 255). This is then used as an index to arrays of size
+MAX_NUMNODE, which is 64 on x86 and 1 on ARM, can be passed in by an
+untrusted guest (via memory_exchange and increase_reservation) and is
+not currently bounds-checked.
+
+Check the value in page_alloc.c before using it, and also check the
+value in the hypercall call sites and return -EINVAL if appropriate.
+Don't permit domains other than the hardware or control domain to
+allocate node-constrained memory.
+
+This is XSA-231.
+
+Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd%bugfuzz.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/common/memory.c.orig
++++ xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -411,6 +411,31 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct
+ a->nr_done = i;
+ }
+
++static bool propagate_node(unsigned int xmf, unsigned int *memflags)
++{
++ const struct domain *currd = current->domain;
++
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(XENMEMF_get_node(0) != NUMA_NO_NODE);
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(MEMF_get_node(0) != NUMA_NO_NODE);
++
++ if ( XENMEMF_get_node(xmf) == NUMA_NO_NODE )
++ return true;
++
++ if ( is_hardware_domain(currd) || is_control_domain(currd) )
++ {
++ if ( XENMEMF_get_node(xmf) >= MAX_NUMNODES )
++ return false;
++
++ *memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(xmf));
++ if ( xmf & XENMEMF_exact_node_request )
++ *memflags |= MEMF_exact_node;
++ }
++ else if ( xmf & XENMEMF_exact_node_request )
++ return false;
++
++ return true;
++}
++
+ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg)
+ {
+ struct xen_memory_exchange exch;
+@@ -483,6 +508,12 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
+ }
+ }
+
++ if ( unlikely(!propagate_node(exch.out.mem_flags, &memflags)) )
++ {
++ rc = -EINVAL;
++ goto fail_early;
++ }
++
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(exch.in.domid);
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ {
+@@ -501,7 +532,6 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
+ d,
+ XENMEMF_get_address_bits(exch.out.mem_flags) ? :
+ (BITS_PER_LONG+PAGE_SHIFT)));
+- memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(exch.out.mem_flags));
+
+ for ( i = (exch.nr_exchanged >> in_chunk_order);
+ i < (exch.in.nr_extents >> in_chunk_order);
+@@ -864,12 +894,8 @@ static int construct_memop_from_reservat
+ }
+ read_unlock(&d->vnuma_rwlock);
+ }
+- else
+- {
+- a->memflags |= MEMF_node(XENMEMF_get_node(r->mem_flags));
+- if ( r->mem_flags & XENMEMF_exact_node_request )
+- a->memflags |= MEMF_exact_node;
+- }
++ else if ( unlikely(!propagate_node(r->mem_flags, &a->memflags)) )
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+--- xen/common/page_alloc.c.orig
++++ xen/common/page_alloc.c
+@@ -706,9 +706,13 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page
+ if ( node >= MAX_NUMNODES )
+ node = cpu_to_node(smp_processor_id());
+ }
++ else if ( unlikely(node >= MAX_NUMNODES) )
++ {
++ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ first_node = node;
+
+- ASSERT(node < MAX_NUMNODES);
+ ASSERT(zone_lo <= zone_hi);
+ ASSERT(zone_hi < NR_ZONES);
+
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA232 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA232,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Subject: grant_table: fix GNTTABOP_cache_flush handling
+
+Don't fall over a NULL grant_table pointer when the owner of the domain
+is a system domain (DOMID_{XEN,IO} etc).
+
+This is XSA-232.
+
+Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd%bugfuzz.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/common/grant_table.c.orig
++++ xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -3053,7 +3053,7 @@ static int cache_flush(gnttab_cache_flus
+
+ page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+ owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page);
+- if ( !owner )
++ if ( !owner || !owner->grant_table )
+ {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA234 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA234,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: gnttab: also validate PTE permissions upon destroy/replace
+
+In order for PTE handling to match up with the reference counting done
+by common code, presence and writability of grant mapping PTEs must
+also be taken into account; validating just the frame number is not
+enough. This is in particular relevant if a guest fiddles with grant
+PTEs via non-grant hypercalls.
+
+Note that the flags being passed to replace_grant_host_mapping()
+already happen to be those of the existing mapping, so no new function
+parameter is needed.
+
+This is XSA-234.
+
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -4017,7 +4017,8 @@ static int create_grant_pte_mapping(
+ }
+
+ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping(
+- uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, struct domain *d)
++ uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags,
++ struct domain *d)
+ {
+ int rc = GNTST_okay;
+ void *va;
+@@ -4063,16 +4064,27 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping(
+
+ ol1e = *(l1_pgentry_t *)va;
+
+- /* Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame. */
+- if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) )
++ /*
++ * Check that the PTE supplied actually maps frame (with appropriate
++ * permissions).
++ */
++ if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) ||
++ unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
++ (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) )
+ {
+ page_unlock(page);
+- MEM_LOG("PTE entry %lx for address %"PRIx64" doesn't match frame %lx",
+- (unsigned long)l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr, frame);
++ MEM_LOG("PTE %"PRIpte" at %"PRIx64" doesn't match grant (%"PRIpte")",
++ l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr,
++ l1e_get_intpte(l1e_from_pfn(frame, grant_pte_flags)));
+ rc = GNTST_general_error;
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
++ if ( unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
++ ~(_PAGE_AVAIL | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS)) )
++ MEM_LOG("PTE flags %x at %"PRIx64" don't match grant (%x)\n",
++ l1e_get_flags(ol1e), addr, grant_pte_flags);
++
+ /* Delete pagetable entry. */
+ if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY
+ (l1,
+@@ -4081,7 +4093,7 @@ static int destroy_grant_pte_mapping(
+ 0)) )
+ {
+ page_unlock(page);
+- MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %p", va);
++ MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %"PRIx64, addr);
+ rc = GNTST_general_error;
+ goto failed;
+ }
+@@ -4149,7 +4161,8 @@ static int create_grant_va_mapping(
+ }
+
+ static int replace_grant_va_mapping(
+- unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, l1_pgentry_t nl1e, struct vcpu *v)
++ unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags,
++ l1_pgentry_t nl1e, struct vcpu *v)
+ {
+ l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, ol1e;
+ unsigned long gl1mfn;
+@@ -4185,19 +4198,30 @@ static int replace_grant_va_mapping(
+
+ ol1e = *pl1e;
+
+- /* Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame. */
+- if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) )
+- {
+- MEM_LOG("PTE entry %lx for address %lx doesn't match frame %lx",
+- l1e_get_pfn(ol1e), addr, frame);
++ /*
++ * Check that the virtual address supplied is actually mapped to frame
++ * (with appropriate permissions).
++ */
++ if ( unlikely(l1e_get_pfn(ol1e) != frame) ||
++ unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
++ (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) )
++ {
++ MEM_LOG("PTE %"PRIpte" for %lx doesn't match grant (%"PRIpte")",
++ l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), addr,
++ l1e_get_intpte(l1e_from_pfn(frame, grant_pte_flags)));
+ rc = GNTST_general_error;
+ goto unlock_and_out;
+ }
+
++ if ( unlikely((l1e_get_flags(ol1e) ^ grant_pte_flags) &
++ ~(_PAGE_AVAIL | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS)) )
++ MEM_LOG("PTE flags %x for %"PRIx64" don't match grant (%x)",
++ l1e_get_flags(ol1e), addr, grant_pte_flags);
++
+ /* Delete pagetable entry. */
+ if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, v, 0)) )
+ {
+- MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry at %p", (unsigned long *)pl1e);
++ MEM_LOG("Cannot delete PTE entry for %"PRIx64, addr);
+ rc = GNTST_general_error;
+ goto unlock_and_out;
+ }
+@@ -4211,9 +4235,11 @@ static int replace_grant_va_mapping(
+ }
+
+ static int destroy_grant_va_mapping(
+- unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, struct vcpu *v)
++ unsigned long addr, unsigned long frame, unsigned int grant_pte_flags,
++ struct vcpu *v)
+ {
+- return replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, l1e_empty(), v);
++ return replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags,
++ l1e_empty(), v);
+ }
+
+ static int create_grant_p2m_mapping(uint64_t addr, unsigned long frame,
+@@ -4307,21 +4333,40 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(
+ unsigned long gl1mfn;
+ struct page_info *l1pg;
+ int rc;
++ unsigned int grant_pte_flags;
+
+ if ( paging_mode_external(current->domain) )
+ return replace_grant_p2m_mapping(addr, frame, new_addr, flags);
+
++ grant_pte_flags =
++ _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_GNTTAB | _PAGE_NX;
++
++ if ( flags & GNTMAP_application_map )
++ grant_pte_flags |= _PAGE_USER;
++ if ( !(flags & GNTMAP_readonly) )
++ grant_pte_flags |= _PAGE_RW;
++ /*
++ * On top of the explicit settings done by create_grant_host_mapping()
++ * also open-code relevant parts of adjust_guest_l1e(). Don't mirror
++ * available and cachability flags, though.
++ */
++ if ( !is_pv_32bit_domain(curr->domain) )
++ grant_pte_flags |= (grant_pte_flags & _PAGE_USER)
++ ? _PAGE_GLOBAL
++ : _PAGE_GUEST_KERNEL | _PAGE_USER;
++
+ if ( flags & GNTMAP_contains_pte )
+ {
+ if ( !new_addr )
+- return destroy_grant_pte_mapping(addr, frame, curr->domain);
++ return destroy_grant_pte_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags,
++ curr->domain);
+
+ MEM_LOG("Unsupported grant table operation");
+ return GNTST_general_error;
+ }
+
+ if ( !new_addr )
+- return destroy_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, curr);
++ return destroy_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, curr);
+
+ pl1e = guest_map_l1e(new_addr, &gl1mfn);
+ if ( !pl1e )
+@@ -4369,7 +4414,7 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(
+ put_page(l1pg);
+ guest_unmap_l1e(pl1e);
+
+- rc = replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, ol1e, curr);
++ rc = replace_grant_va_mapping(addr, frame, grant_pte_flags, ol1e, curr);
+ if ( rc && !paging_mode_refcounts(curr->domain) )
+ put_page_from_l1e(ol1e, curr->domain);
+
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA237 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA237,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86: don't allow MSI pIRQ mapping on unowned device
+
+MSI setup should be permitted only for existing devices owned by the
+respective guest (the operation may still be carried out by the domain
+controlling that guest).
+
+This is part of XSA-237.
+
+Reported-by: HW42 <hw42%ipsumj.de@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/irq.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+@@ -1964,7 +1964,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ if ( !cpu_has_apic )
+ goto done;
+
+- pdev = pci_get_pdev(msi->seg, msi->bus, msi->devfn);
++ pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, msi->seg, msi->bus, msi->devfn);
++ if ( !pdev )
++ goto done;
++
+ ret = pci_enable_msi(msi, &msi_desc);
+ if ( ret )
+ {
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86: enforce proper privilege when (un)mapping pIRQ-s
+
+(Un)mapping of IRQs, just like other RESOURCE__ADD* / RESOURCE__REMOVE*
+actions (in FLASK terms) should be XSM_DM_PRIV rather than XSM_TARGET.
+This in turn requires bypassing the XSM check in physdev_unmap_pirq()
+for the HVM emuirq case just like is being done in physdev_map_pirq().
+The primary goal security wise, however, is to no longer allow HVM
+guests, by specifying their own domain ID instead of DOMID_SELF, to
+enter code paths intended for PV guest and the control domains of HVM
+guests only.
+
+This is part of XSA-237.
+
+Reported-by: HW42 <hw42%ipsumj.de@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/physdev.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+- ret = xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_TARGET, d);
++ ret = xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d);
+ if ( ret )
+ goto free_domain;
+
+@@ -255,13 +255,14 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
+ int physdev_unmap_pirq(domid_t domid, int pirq)
+ {
+ struct domain *d;
+- int ret;
++ int ret = 0;
+
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(domid);
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+- ret = xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_TARGET, d);
++ if ( domid != DOMID_SELF || !is_hvm_domain(d) )
++ ret = xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d);
+ if ( ret )
+ goto free_domain;
+
+--- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h.orig
++++ xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE char *xsm_show_irq_sid
+
+ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_domain_pirq(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
+ {
+- XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
++ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+ return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+
+@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_domain_irq
+
+ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
+ {
+- XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
++ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+ return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/MSI: disallow redundant enabling
+
+At the moment, Xen attempts to allow redundant enabling of MSI by
+having pci_enable_msi() return 0, and point to the existing MSI
+descriptor, when the msi already exists.
+
+Unfortunately, if subsequent errors are encountered, the cleanup
+paths assume pci_enable_msi() had done full initialization, and
+hence undo everything that was assumed to be done by that
+function without also undoing other setup that would normally
+occur only after that function was called (in map_domain_pirq()
+itself).
+
+Rather than try to make the redundant enabling case work properly, just
+forbid it entirely by having pci_enable_msi() return -EEXIST when MSI
+is already set up.
+
+This is part of XSA-237.
+
+Reported-by: HW42 <hw42%ipsumj.de@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/msi.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+@@ -1050,11 +1050,10 @@ static int __pci_enable_msi(struct msi_i
+ old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, msi->irq, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
+ if ( old_desc )
+ {
+- printk(XENLOG_WARNING "irq %d already mapped to MSI on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
++ printk(XENLOG_ERR "irq %d already mapped to MSI on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+ msi->irq, msi->seg, msi->bus,
+ PCI_SLOT(msi->devfn), PCI_FUNC(msi->devfn));
+- *desc = old_desc;
+- return 0;
++ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+@@ -1118,11 +1117,10 @@ static int __pci_enable_msix(struct msi_
+ old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, msi->irq, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+ if ( old_desc )
+ {
+- printk(XENLOG_WARNING "irq %d already mapped to MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
++ printk(XENLOG_ERR "irq %d already mapped to MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+ msi->irq, msi->seg, msi->bus,
+ PCI_SLOT(msi->devfn), PCI_FUNC(msi->devfn));
+- *desc = old_desc;
+- return 0;
++ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/IRQ: conditionally preserve irq <-> pirq mapping on map error paths
+
+Mappings that had been set up before should not be torn down when
+handling unrelated errors.
+
+This is part of XSA-237.
+
+Reported-by: HW42 <hw42%ipsumj.de@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/irq.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+@@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static int prepare_domain_irq_pirq(struc
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ *pinfo = info;
+- return 0;
++
++ return !!err;
+ }
+
+ static void set_domain_irq_pirq(struct domain *d, int irq, struct pirq *pirq)
+@@ -1295,7 +1296,10 @@ int init_domain_irq_mapping(struct domai
+ continue;
+ err = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, i, i, &info);
+ if ( err )
++ {
++ ASSERT(err < 0);
+ break;
++ }
+ set_domain_irq_pirq(d, i, info);
+ }
+
+@@ -1903,6 +1907,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ struct pirq *info;
+ struct irq_desc *desc;
+ unsigned long flags;
++ DECLARE_BITMAP(prepared, MAX_MSI_IRQS) = {};
+
+ ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&d->event_lock));
+
+@@ -1946,8 +1951,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ }
+
+ ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info);
+- if ( ret )
++ if ( ret < 0 )
+ goto revoke;
++ if ( !ret )
++ __set_bit(0, prepared);
+
+ desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
+
+@@ -2019,8 +2026,10 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE);
+ ret = irq >= 0 ? prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq + nr, &info)
+ : irq;
+- if ( ret )
++ if ( ret < 0 )
+ break;
++ if ( !ret )
++ __set_bit(nr, prepared);
+ msi_desc[nr].irq = irq;
+
+ if ( irq_permit_access(d, irq) != 0 )
+@@ -2053,15 +2062,15 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ desc->msi_desc = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
+ }
+- while ( nr-- )
++ while ( nr )
+ {
+ if ( irq >= 0 && irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
+- if ( info )
++ if ( info && test_bit(nr, prepared) )
+ cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
+- info = pirq_info(d, pirq + nr);
++ info = pirq_info(d, pirq + --nr);
+ irq = info->arch.irq;
+ }
+ msi_desc->irq = -1;
+@@ -2077,12 +2086,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
+ set_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
++ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ if ( ret )
+ {
+- cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
++ if ( test_bit(0, prepared) )
++ cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
+ revoke:
+ if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+--- xen/arch/x86/physdev.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
+ }
+ else if ( type == MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MULTI_MSI )
+ {
+- if ( msi->entry_nr <= 0 || msi->entry_nr > 32 )
++ if ( msi->entry_nr <= 0 || msi->entry_nr > MAX_MSI_IRQS )
+ ret = -EDOM;
+ else if ( msi->entry_nr != 1 && !iommu_intremap )
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
+@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@
+ /* MAX fixed pages reserved for mapping MSIX tables. */
+ #define FIX_MSIX_MAX_PAGES 512
+
++#define MAX_MSI_IRQS 32 /* limited by MSI capability struct properties */
++
+ struct msi_info {
+ u16 seg;
+ u8 bus;
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/FLASK: fix unmap-domain-IRQ XSM hook
+
+The caller and the FLASK implementation of xsm_unmap_domain_irq()
+disagreed about what the "data" argument points to in the MSI case:
+Change both sides to pass/take a PCI device.
+
+This is part of XSA-237.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/irq.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+@@ -2144,7 +2144,8 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d,
+ nr = msi_desc->msi.nvec;
+ }
+
+- ret = xsm_unmap_domain_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, msi_desc);
++ ret = xsm_unmap_domain_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, irq,
++ msi_desc ? msi_desc->dev : NULL);
+ if ( ret )
+ goto done;
+
+--- xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c.orig
++++ xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -915,8 +915,8 @@ static int flask_unmap_domain_msi (struc
+ u32 *sid, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
+- struct msi_info *msi = data;
+- u32 machine_bdf = (msi->seg << 16) | (msi->bus << 8) | msi->devfn;
++ const struct pci_dev *pdev = data;
++ u32 machine_bdf = (pdev->seg << 16) | (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, DEV);
+ ad->device = machine_bdf;
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA238 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA238,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From cdc2887076b19b39fab9faec495082586f3113df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: XenProject Security Team <security%xenproject.org@localhost>
+Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 13:41:37 +0200
+Subject: x86/ioreq server: correctly handle bogus
+ XEN_DMOP_{,un}map_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments
+
+Misbehaving device model can pass incorrect XEN_DMOP_map/
+unmap_io_range_to_ioreq_server arguments, namely end < start when
+specifying address range. When this happens we hit ASSERT(s <= e) in
+rangeset_contains_range()/rangeset_overlaps_range() with debug builds.
+Production builds will not trap right away but may misbehave later
+while handling such bogus ranges.
+
+This is XSA-238.
+
+Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets%redhat.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
+index b2a8b0e986..8c8bf1f0ec 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
+@@ -820,6 +820,9 @@ int hvm_map_io_range_to_ioreq_server(struct domain *d, ioservid_t id,
+ struct hvm_ioreq_server *s;
+ int rc;
+
++ if ( start > end )
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ spin_lock_recursive(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.lock);
+
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+@@ -872,6 +875,9 @@ int hvm_unmap_io_range_from_ioreq_server(struct domain *d, ioservid_t id,
+ struct hvm_ioreq_server *s;
+ int rc;
+
++ if ( start > end )
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ spin_lock_recursive(&d->arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.lock);
+
+ rc = -ENOENT;
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA239 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA239,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/HVM: prefill partially used variable on emulation paths
+
+Certain handlers ignore the access size (vioapic_write() being the
+example this was found with), perhaps leading to subsequent reads
+seeing data that wasn't actually written by the guest. For
+consistency and extra safety also do this on the read path of
+hvm_process_io_intercept(), even if this doesn't directly affect what
+guests get to see, as we've supposedly already dealt with read handlers
+leaving data completely unitialized.
+
+This is XSA-239.
+
+Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau%citrix.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io(
+ .count = *reps,
+ .dir = dir,
+ .df = df,
+- .data = data,
++ .data = data_is_addr ? data : 0,
+ .data_is_ptr = data_is_addr, /* ioreq_t field name is misleading */
+ .state = STATE_IOREQ_READY,
+ };
+--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int hvm_process_io_intercept(const struc
+ addr = (p->type == IOREQ_TYPE_COPY) ?
+ p->addr + step * i :
+ p->addr;
++ data = 0;
+ rc = ops->read(handler, addr, p->size, &data);
+ if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+ break;
+@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ int hvm_process_io_intercept(const struc
+ {
+ if ( p->data_is_ptr )
+ {
++ data = 0;
+ switch ( hvm_copy_from_guest_phys(&data, p->data + step * i,
+ p->size) )
+ {
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA240 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA240,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From 2315b8c651e0cc31c9153d09c9912b8fbe632ad2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 15:17:25 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86: limit linear page table use to a single level
+
+That's the only way that they're meant to be used. Without such a
+restriction arbitrarily long chains of same-level page tables can be
+built, tearing down of which may then cause arbitrarily deep recursion,
+causing a stack overflow. To facilitate this restriction, a counter is
+being introduced to track both the number of same-level entries in a
+page table as well as the number of uses of a page table in another
+same-level one (counting into positive and negative direction
+respectively, utilizing the fact that both counts can't be non-zero at
+the same time).
+
+Note that the added accounting introduces a restriction on the number
+of times a page can be used in other same-level page tables - more than
+32k of such uses are no longer possible.
+
+Note also that some put_page_and_type[_preemptible]() calls are
+replaced with open-coded equivalents. This seemed preferrable to
+adding "parent_table" to the matrix of functions.
+
+Note further that cross-domain same-level page table references are no
+longer permitted (they probably never should have been).
+
+This is XSA-240.
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh%google.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 1 +
+ xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 2 +
+ xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 25 +++++--
+ 4 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+index a725b43a67..5265b0496c 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/domain.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+@@ -1245,6 +1245,7 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
+ rc = -ERESTART;
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case -ERESTART:
++ v->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
+ v->arch.old_guest_table =
+ pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
+ v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+index a40461d4d6..31d4a03840 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -733,6 +733,61 @@ static void put_data_page(
+ put_page(page);
+ }
+
++static bool inc_linear_entries(struct page_info *pg)
++{
++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) nc = read_atomic(&pg->linear_pt_count), oc;
++
++ do {
++ /*
++ * The check below checks for the "linear use" count being non-zero
++ * as well as overflow. Signed integer overflow is undefined behavior
++ * according to the C spec. However, as long as linear_pt_count is
++ * smaller in size than 'int', the arithmetic operation of the
++ * increment below won't overflow; rather the result will be truncated
++ * when stored. Ensure that this is always true.
++ */
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(nc) >= sizeof(int));
++ oc = nc++;
++ if ( nc <= 0 )
++ return false;
++ nc = cmpxchg(&pg->linear_pt_count, oc, nc);
++ } while ( oc != nc );
++
++ return true;
++}
++
++static void dec_linear_entries(struct page_info *pg)
++{
++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) oc;
++
++ oc = arch_fetch_and_add(&pg->linear_pt_count, -1);
++ ASSERT(oc > 0);
++}
++
++static bool inc_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg)
++{
++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) nc = read_atomic(&pg->linear_pt_count), oc;
++
++ do {
++ /* See the respective comment in inc_linear_entries(). */
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(nc) >= sizeof(int));
++ oc = nc--;
++ if ( nc >= 0 )
++ return false;
++ nc = cmpxchg(&pg->linear_pt_count, oc, nc);
++ } while ( oc != nc );
++
++ return true;
++}
++
++static void dec_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg)
++{
++ typeof(pg->linear_pt_count) oc;
++
++ oc = arch_fetch_and_add(&pg->linear_pt_count, 1);
++ ASSERT(oc < 0);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We allow root tables to map each other (a.k.a. linear page tables). It
+ * needs some special care with reference counts and access permissions:
+@@ -762,15 +817,35 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \
+ \
+ if ( (pfn = level##e_get_pfn(pde)) != pde_pfn ) \
+ { \
++ struct page_info *ptpg = mfn_to_page(pde_pfn); \
++ \
++ /* Make sure the page table belongs to the correct domain. */ \
++ if ( unlikely(page_get_owner(ptpg) != d) ) \
++ return 0; \
++ \
+ /* Make sure the mapped frame belongs to the correct domain. */ \
+ if ( unlikely(!get_page_from_pagenr(pfn, d)) ) \
+ return 0; \
+ \
+ /* \
+- * Ensure that the mapped frame is an already-validated page table. \
++ * Ensure that the mapped frame is an already-validated page table \
++ * and is not itself having linear entries, as well as that the \
++ * containing page table is not iself in use as a linear page table \
++ * elsewhere. \
+ * If so, atomically increment the count (checking for overflow). \
+ */ \
+ page = mfn_to_page(pfn); \
++ if ( !inc_linear_entries(ptpg) ) \
++ { \
++ put_page(page); \
++ return 0; \
++ } \
++ if ( !inc_linear_uses(page) ) \
++ { \
++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg); \
++ put_page(page); \
++ return 0; \
++ } \
+ y = page->u.inuse.type_info; \
+ do { \
+ x = y; \
+@@ -778,6 +853,8 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \
+ unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_validated)) != \
+ (PGT_##level##_page_table|PGT_validated)) ) \
+ { \
++ dec_linear_uses(page); \
++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg); \
+ put_page(page); \
+ return 0; \
+ } \
+@@ -1202,6 +1279,9 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
+ l3e_remove_flags((pl3e), _PAGE_USER|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_ACCESSED); \
+ } while ( 0 )
+
++static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible,
++ struct page_info *ptpg);
++
+ void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner)
+ {
+ unsigned long pfn = l1e_get_pfn(l1e);
+@@ -1271,17 +1351,22 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn)
+ if ( l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE )
+ put_superpage(l2e_get_pfn(l2e));
+ else
+- put_page_and_type(l2e_get_page(l2e));
++ {
++ struct page_info *pg = l2e_get_page(l2e);
++ int rc = _put_page_type(pg, false, mfn_to_page(pfn));
++
++ ASSERT(!rc);
++ put_page(pg);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *, int preemptible);
+-
+ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
+ int partial, bool_t defer)
+ {
+ struct page_info *pg;
++ int rc;
+
+ if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || (l3e_get_pfn(l3e) == pfn) )
+ return 1;
+@@ -1304,21 +1389,28 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
+ if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
+ {
+ ASSERT(!defer);
+- return __put_page_type(pg, 1);
++ return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn));
+ }
+
+ if ( defer )
+ {
++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(pfn);
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg);
++ rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn));
++ if ( likely(!rc) )
++ put_page(pg);
++
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
+ int partial, bool_t defer)
+ {
++ int rc = 1;
++
+ if ( (l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) &&
+ (l4e_get_pfn(l4e) != pfn) )
+ {
+@@ -1327,18 +1419,22 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
+ if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
+ {
+ ASSERT(!defer);
+- return __put_page_type(pg, 1);
++ return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn));
+ }
+
+ if ( defer )
+ {
++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(pfn);
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg);
++ rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(pfn));
++ if ( likely(!rc) )
++ put_page(pg);
+ }
+- return 1;
++
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_info *page)
+@@ -1536,6 +1632,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
+ {
+ page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
+ page->partial_pte = 0;
++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
+ while ( i-- > 0 )
+@@ -1628,6 +1725,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
+ {
+ if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
+ page->nr_validated_ptes++;
++ current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2370,14 +2468,20 @@ int free_page_type(struct page_info *pag
+ }
+
+
+-static int __put_final_page_type(
+- struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, int preemptible)
++static int _put_final_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
++ bool preemptible, struct page_info *ptpg)
+ {
+ int rc = free_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
+
+ /* No need for atomic update of type_info here: noone else updates it. */
+ if ( rc == 0 )
+ {
++ if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(type, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
++ {
++ dec_linear_uses(page);
++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg);
++ }
++ ASSERT(!page->linear_pt_count || page_get_owner(page)->is_dying);
+ /*
+ * Record TLB information for flush later. We do not stamp page tables
+ * when running in shadow mode:
+@@ -2413,8 +2517,8 @@ static int __put_final_page_type(
+ }
+
+
+-static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page,
+- int preemptible)
++static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible,
++ struct page_info *ptpg)
+ {
+ unsigned long nx, x, y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
+ int rc = 0;
+@@ -2441,12 +2545,28 @@ static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page,
+ x, nx)) != x) )
+ continue;
+ /* We cleared the 'valid bit' so we do the clean up. */
+- rc = __put_final_page_type(page, x, preemptible);
++ rc = _put_final_page_type(page, x, preemptible, ptpg);
++ ptpg = NULL;
+ if ( x & PGT_partial )
+ put_page(page);
+ break;
+ }
+
++ if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
++ {
++ /*
++ * page_set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union
++ * linear_pt_count lives in. Unvalidated page table pages,
++ * however, should occur during domain destruction only
++ * anyway. Updating of linear_pt_count luckily is not
++ * necessary anymore for a dying domain.
++ */
++ ASSERT(page_get_owner(page)->is_dying);
++ ASSERT(page->linear_pt_count < 0);
++ ASSERT(ptpg->linear_pt_count > 0);
++ ptpg = NULL;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Record TLB information for flush later. We do not stamp page
+ * tables when running in shadow mode:
+@@ -2466,6 +2586,13 @@ static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *page,
+ return -EINTR;
+ }
+
++ if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
++ {
++ ASSERT(!rc);
++ dec_linear_uses(page);
++ dec_linear_entries(ptpg);
++ }
++
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+@@ -2600,6 +2727,7 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
+ page->nr_validated_ptes = 0;
+ page->partial_pte = 0;
+ }
++ page->linear_pt_count = 0;
+ rc = alloc_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
+ }
+
+@@ -2614,7 +2742,7 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
+
+ void put_page_type(struct page_info *page)
+ {
+- int rc = __put_page_type(page, 0);
++ int rc = _put_page_type(page, false, NULL);
+ ASSERT(rc == 0);
+ (void)rc;
+ }
+@@ -2630,7 +2758,7 @@ int get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
+
+ int put_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page)
+ {
+- return __put_page_type(page, 1);
++ return _put_page_type(page, true, NULL);
+ }
+
+ int get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
+@@ -2836,11 +2964,14 @@ int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
+ if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
+ return 0;
+
+- switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(v->arch.old_guest_table) )
++ switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, true,
++ v->arch.old_guest_ptpg) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -ERESTART:
+ return -ERESTART;
++ case 0:
++ put_page(v->arch.old_guest_table);
+ }
+
+ v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
+@@ -2997,6 +3128,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
+ rc = -ERESTART;
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case -ERESTART:
++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ break;
+ default:
+@@ -3264,7 +3396,10 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
+ if ( type == PGT_l1_page_table )
+ put_page_and_type(page);
+ else
++ {
++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -3297,6 +3432,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -ERESTART:
++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+@@ -3375,6 +3511,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
+ rc = -ERESTART;
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case -ERESTART:
++ curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ break;
+ default:
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+index f6a40eb881..60bb8c9014 100644
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+@@ -531,6 +531,8 @@ struct arch_vcpu
+ pagetable_t guest_table_user; /* (MFN) x86/64 user-space pagetable */
+ pagetable_t guest_table; /* (MFN) guest notion of cr3 */
+ struct page_info *old_guest_table; /* partially destructed pagetable */
++ struct page_info *old_guest_ptpg; /* containing page table of the */
++ /* former, if any */
+ /* guest_table holds a ref to the page, and also a type-count unless
+ * shadow refcounts are in use */
+ pagetable_t shadow_table[4]; /* (MFN) shadow(s) of guest */
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+index 6687dbc985..63590a7716 100644
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ struct page_info
+ u32 tlbflush_timestamp;
+
+ /*
+- * When PGT_partial is true then this field is valid and indicates
+- * that PTEs in the range [0, @nr_validated_ptes) have been validated.
+- * An extra page reference must be acquired (or not dropped) whenever
+- * PGT_partial gets set, and it must be dropped when the flag gets
+- * cleared. This is so that a get() leaving a page in partially
++ * When PGT_partial is true then the first two fields are valid and
++ * indicate that PTEs in the range [0, @nr_validated_ptes) have been
++ * validated. An extra page reference must be acquired (or not dropped)
++ * whenever PGT_partial gets set, and it must be dropped when the flag
++ * gets cleared. This is so that a get() leaving a page in partially
+ * validated state (where the caller would drop the reference acquired
+ * due to the getting of the type [apparently] failing [-ERESTART])
+ * would not accidentally result in a page left with zero general
+@@ -153,10 +153,18 @@ struct page_info
+ * put_page_from_lNe() (due to the apparent failure), and hence it
+ * must be dropped when the put operation is resumed (and completes),
+ * but it must not be acquired if picking up the page for validation.
++ *
++ * The 3rd field, @linear_pt_count, indicates
++ * - by a positive value, how many same-level page table entries a page
++ * table has,
++ * - by a negative value, in how many same-level page tables a page is
++ * in use.
+ */
+ struct {
+- u16 nr_validated_ptes;
+- s8 partial_pte;
++ u16 nr_validated_ptes:PAGETABLE_ORDER + 1;
++ u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 2;
++ s16 partial_pte:2;
++ s16 linear_pt_count;
+ };
+
+ /*
+@@ -207,6 +215,9 @@ struct page_info
+ #define PGT_count_width PG_shift(9)
+ #define PGT_count_mask ((1UL<<PGT_count_width)-1)
+
++/* Are the 'type mask' bits identical? */
++#define PGT_type_equal(x, y) (!(((x) ^ (y)) & PGT_type_mask))
++
+ /* Cleared when the owning guest 'frees' this page. */
+ #define _PGC_allocated PG_shift(1)
+ #define PGC_allocated PG_mask(1, 1)
+--
+2.14.1
+
+From 41d579aad2fee971e5ce0279a9b559a0fdc74452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:46:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Disable PV linear pagetables by default
+
+Allowing pagetables to point to other pagetables of the same level
+(often called 'linear pagetables') has been included in Xen since its
+inception. But it is not used by the most common PV guests (Linux,
+NetBSD, minios), and has been the source of a number of subtle
+reference-counting bugs.
+
+Add a command-line option to control whether PV linear pagetables are
+allowed (disabled by default).
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh%google.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+---
+Changes since v2:
+- s/_/-/; in command-line option
+- Added __read_mostly
+---
+ docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+index 54acc60723..ffa66eb146 100644
+--- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown.orig
++++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+@@ -1350,6 +1350,21 @@ The following resources are available:
+ CDP, one COS will corespond two CBMs other than one with CAT, due to the
+ sum of CBMs is fixed, that means actual `cos_max` in use will automatically
+ reduce to half when CDP is enabled.
++
++### pv-linear-pt
++> `= <boolean>`
++
++> Default: `true`
++
++Allow PV guests to have pagetable entries pointing to other pagetables
++of the same level (i.e., allowing L2 PTEs to point to other L2 pages).
++This technique is often called "linear pagetables", and is sometimes
++used to allow operating systems a simple way to consistently map the
++current process's pagetables into its own virtual address space.
++
++None of the most common PV operating systems (Linux, MiniOS)
++use this technique, but NetBSD in PV mode, and maybe custom operating
++systems which do.
+
+ ### reboot
+ > `= t[riple] | k[bd] | a[cpi] | p[ci] | P[ower] | e[fi] | n[o] [, [w]arm | [c]old]`
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+index 31d4a03840..5d125cff3a 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -800,6 +800,9 @@ static void dec_linear_uses(struct page_info *pg)
+ * frame if it is mapped by a different root table. This is sufficient and
+ * also necessary to allow validation of a root table mapping itself.
+ */
++static bool __read_mostly pv_linear_pt_enable = true;
++boolean_param("pv-linear-pt", pv_linear_pt_enable);
++
+ #define define_get_linear_pagetable(level) \
+ static int \
+ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \
+@@ -809,6 +812,12 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( \
+ struct page_info *page; \
+ unsigned long pfn; \
+ \
++ if ( !pv_linear_pt_enable ) \
++ { \
++ MEM_LOG("Attempt to create linear p.t. (feature disabled)"); \
++ return 0; \
++ } \
++ \
+ if ( (level##e_get_flags(pde) & _PAGE_RW) ) \
+ { \
+ MEM_LOG("Attempt to create linear p.t. with write perms"); \
+--
+2.14.1
+
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA241 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA241,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+x86: don't store possibly stale TLB flush time stamp
+
+While the timing window is extremely narrow, it is theoretically
+possible for an update to the TLB flush clock and a subsequent flush
+IPI to happen between the read and write parts of the update of the
+per-page stamp. Exclude this possibility by disabling interrupts
+across the update, preventing the IPI to be serviced in the middle.
+
+This is XSA-241.
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh%google.com@localhost>
+Suggested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/arm/smp.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/arm/smp.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
+ #include <xen/config.h>
++#include <xen/mm.h>
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/smp.h>
+ #include <asm/cpregs.h>
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -2524,7 +2524,7 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct p
+ */
+ if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) &&
+ (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
+- page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
+ wmb();
+ page->u.inuse.type_info--;
+ }
+@@ -2534,7 +2534,7 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct p
+ (PGT_count_mask|PGT_validated|PGT_partial)) == 1);
+ if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) &&
+ (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
+- page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
+ wmb();
+ page->u.inuse.type_info |= PGT_validated;
+ }
+@@ -2588,7 +2588,7 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in
+ if ( ptpg && PGT_type_equal(x, ptpg->u.inuse.type_info) )
+ {
+ /*
+- * page_set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union
++ * set_tlbflush_timestamp() accesses the same union
+ * linear_pt_count lives in. Unvalidated page table pages,
+ * however, should occur during domain destruction only
+ * anyway. Updating of linear_pt_count luckily is not
+@@ -2609,7 +2609,7 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in
+ */
+ if ( !(shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) &&
+ (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
+- page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
+ }
+
+ if ( likely((y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) == x) )
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t
+ * TLBs when we reuse the page. Because the destructors leave the
+ * contents of the pages in place, we can delay TLB flushes until
+ * just before the allocator hands the page out again. */
+- sp->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(sp);
+ perfc_decr(shadow_alloc_count);
+ page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
+ sp = next;
+--- xen/common/page_alloc.c.orig
++++ xen/common/page_alloc.c
+@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ static void free_heap_pages(
+ /* If a page has no owner it will need no safety TLB flush. */
+ pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush = (page_get_owner(&pg[i]) != NULL);
+ if ( pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush )
+- pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
++ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(&pg[i]);
+
+ /* This page is not a guest frame any more. */
+ page_set_owner(&pg[i], NULL); /* set_gpfn_from_mfn snoops pg owner */
+--- xen/include/asm-arm/flushtlb.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-arm/flushtlb.h
+@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ static inline void tlbflush_filter(cpuma
+
+ #define tlbflush_current_time() (0)
+
++static inline void page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(struct page_info *page)
++{
++ page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
++}
++
+ #if defined(CONFIG_ARM_32)
+ # include <asm/arm32/flushtlb.h>
+ #elif defined(CONFIG_ARM_64)
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/flushtlb.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/flushtlb.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,20 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, tlbflush_time);
+
+ #define tlbflush_current_time() tlbflush_clock
+
++static inline void page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(struct page_info *page)
++{
++ /*
++ * Prevent storing a stale time stamp, which could happen if an update
++ * to tlbflush_clock plus a subsequent flush IPI happen between the
++ * reading of tlbflush_clock and the writing of the struct page_info
++ * field.
++ */
++ ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
++ local_irq_disable();
++ page->tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
++ local_irq_enable();
++}
++
+ /*
+ * @cpu_stamp is the timestamp at last TLB flush for the CPU we are testing.
+ * @lastuse_stamp is a timestamp taken when the PFN we are testing was last
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA242 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA242,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86: don't allow page_unlock() to drop the last type reference
+
+Only _put_page_type() does the necessary cleanup, and hence not all
+domain pages can be released during guest cleanup (leaving around
+zombie domains) if we get this wrong.
+
+This is XSA-242.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -1923,7 +1923,11 @@ void page_unlock(struct page_info *page)
+
+ do {
+ x = y;
++ ASSERT((x & PGT_count_mask) && (x & PGT_locked));
++
+ nx = x - (1 | PGT_locked);
++ /* We must not drop the last reference here. */
++ ASSERT(nx & PGT_count_mask);
+ } while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) != x );
+ }
+
+@@ -2611,6 +2615,17 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_in
+ (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)) )
+ page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(page);
+ }
++ else if ( unlikely((nx & (PGT_locked | PGT_count_mask)) ==
++ (PGT_locked | 1)) )
++ {
++ /*
++ * We must not drop the second to last reference when the page is
++ * locked, as page_unlock() doesn't do any cleanup of the type.
++ */
++ cpu_relax();
++ y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
++ continue;
++ }
+
+ if ( likely((y = cmpxchg(&page->u.inuse.type_info, x, nx)) == x) )
+ break;
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA243 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA243,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/shadow: Don't create self-linear shadow mappings for 4-level translated guests
+
+When initially creating a monitor table for 4-level translated guests, don't
+install a shadow-linear mapping. This mapping is actually self-linear, and
+trips up the writeable heuristic logic into following Xen's mappings, not the
+guests' shadows it was expecting to follow.
+
+A consequence of this is that sh_guess_wrmap() needs to cope with there being
+no shadow-linear mapping present, which in practice occurs once each time a
+vcpu switches to 4-level paging from a different paging mode.
+
+An appropriate shadow-linear slot will be inserted into the monitor table
+either while constructing lower level monitor tables, or by sh_update_cr3().
+
+While fixing this, clarify the safety of the other mappings. Despite
+appearing unsafe, it is correct to create a guest-linear mapping for
+translated domains; this is self-linear and doesn't point into the translated
+domain. Drop a dead clause for translate != external guests.
+
+This is XSA-243.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim%xen.org@localhost>
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+index d70b1c6..029e8d4 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+@@ -1472,26 +1472,38 @@ void sh_install_xen_entries_in_l4(struct domain *d, mfn_t gl4mfn, mfn_t sl4mfn)
+ sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(RO_MPT_VIRT_START)] = shadow_l4e_empty();
+ }
+
+- /* Shadow linear mapping for 4-level shadows. N.B. for 3-level
+- * shadows on 64-bit xen, this linear mapping is later replaced by the
+- * monitor pagetable structure, which is built in make_monitor_table
+- * and maintained by sh_update_linear_entries. */
+- sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
+- shadow_l4e_from_mfn(sl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
+-
+- /* Self linear mapping. */
+- if ( shadow_mode_translate(d) && !shadow_mode_external(d) )
++ /*
++ * Linear mapping slots:
++ *
++ * Calling this function with gl4mfn == sl4mfn is used to construct a
++ * monitor table for translated domains. In this case, gl4mfn forms the
++ * self-linear mapping (i.e. not pointing into the translated domain), and
++ * the shadow-linear slot is skipped. The shadow-linear slot is either
++ * filled when constructing lower level monitor tables, or via
++ * sh_update_cr3() for 4-level guests.
++ *
++ * Calling this function with gl4mfn != sl4mfn is used for non-translated
++ * guests, where the shadow-linear slot is actually self-linear, and the
++ * guest-linear slot points into the guests view of its pagetables.
++ */
++ if ( shadow_mode_translate(d) )
+ {
+- // linear tables may not be used with translated PV guests
+- sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
++ ASSERT(mfn_eq(gl4mfn, sl4mfn));
++
++ sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
+ shadow_l4e_empty();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
+- shadow_l4e_from_mfn(gl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
++ ASSERT(!mfn_eq(gl4mfn, sl4mfn));
++
++ sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
++ shadow_l4e_from_mfn(sl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
+ }
+
++ sl4e[shadow_l4_table_offset(LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START)] =
++ shadow_l4e_from_mfn(gl4mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
++
+ unmap_domain_page(sl4e);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -4287,6 +4299,11 @@ static int sh_guess_wrmap(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr, mfn_t gmfn)
+
+ /* Carefully look in the shadow linear map for the l1e we expect */
+ #if SHADOW_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
++ /* Is a shadow linear map is installed in the first place? */
++ sl4p = v->arch.paging.shadow.guest_vtable;
++ sl4p += shadow_l4_table_offset(SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START);
++ if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ return 0;
+ sl4p = sh_linear_l4_table(v) + shadow_l4_linear_offset(vaddr);
+ if ( !(shadow_l4e_get_flags(*sl4p) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+ return 0;
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel48/patches/patch-XSA244 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA244,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu: Fix IST handling during PCPU bringup
+
+Clear IST references in newly allocated IDTs. Nothing good will come of
+having them set before the TSS is suitably constructed (although the chances
+of the CPU surviving such an IST interrupt/exception is extremely slim).
+
+Uniformly set the IST references after the TSS is in place. This fixes an
+issue on AMD hardware, where onlining a PCPU while PCPU0 is in HVM context
+will cause IST_NONE to be copied into the new IDT, making that PCPU vulnerable
+to privilege escalation from PV guests until it subsequently schedules an HVM
+guest.
+
+This is XSA-244
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 5 +++++
+ xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+index 78f5667..6cf3628 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+@@ -640,6 +640,7 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void)
+ * - Sets up TSS with stack pointers, including ISTs
+ * - Inserts TSS selector into regular and compat GDTs
+ * - Loads GDT, IDT, TR then null LDT
++ * - Sets up IST references in the IDT
+ */
+ void load_system_tables(void)
+ {
+@@ -702,6 +703,10 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
+ asm volatile ("ltr %w0" : : "rm" (TSS_ENTRY << 3) );
+ asm volatile ("lldt %w0" : : "rm" (0) );
+
++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault], IST_DF);
++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi], IST_NMI);
++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_MCE);
++
+ /*
+ * Bottom-of-stack must be 16-byte aligned!
+ *
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+index 3ca716c..1609b62 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+@@ -724,6 +724,9 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
+ if ( idt_tables[cpu] == NULL )
+ goto oom;
+ memcpy(idt_tables[cpu], idt_table, IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t));
++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_double_fault], IST_NONE);
++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_nmi], IST_NONE);
++ set_ist(&idt_tables[cpu][TRAP_machine_check], IST_NONE);
+
+ for ( stub_page = 0, i = cpu & ~(STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1);
+ i < nr_cpu_ids && i <= (cpu | (STUBS_PER_PAGE - 1)); ++i )
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA233 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA233,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: tools/xenstore: dont unlink connection object twice
+
+A connection object of a domain with associated stubdom has two
+parents: the domain and the stubdom. When cleaning up the list of
+active domains in domain_cleanup() make sure not to unlink the
+connection twice from the same domain. This could happen when the
+domain and its stubdom are being destroyed at the same time leading
+to the domain loop being entered twice.
+
+Additionally don't use talloc_free() in this case as it will remove
+a random parent link, leading eventually to a memory leak. Use
+talloc_unlink() instead specifying the context from which the
+connection object should be removed.
+
+This is XSA-233.
+
+Reported-by: Eric Chanudet <chanudete%ainfosec.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson%eu.citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c.orig
++++ tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
+@@ -221,10 +221,11 @@ static int destroy_domain(void *_domain)
+ static void domain_cleanup(void)
+ {
+ xc_dominfo_t dominfo;
+- struct domain *domain, *tmp;
++ struct domain *domain;
+ int notify = 0;
+
+- list_for_each_entry_safe(domain, tmp, &domains, list) {
++ again:
++ list_for_each_entry(domain, &domains, list) {
+ if (xc_domain_getinfo(*xc_handle, domain->domid, 1,
+ &dominfo) == 1 &&
+ dominfo.domid == domain->domid) {
+@@ -236,8 +237,12 @@ static void domain_cleanup(void)
+ if (!dominfo.dying)
+ continue;
+ }
+- talloc_free(domain->conn);
+- notify = 0; /* destroy_domain() fires the watch */
++ if (domain->conn) {
++ talloc_unlink(talloc_autofree_context(), domain->conn);
++ domain->conn = NULL;
++ notify = 0; /* destroy_domain() fires the watch */
++ goto again;
++ }
+ }
+
+ if (notify)
Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240:1.1
--- /dev/null Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xentools48/patches/patch-XSA240 Tue Oct 17 08:42:30 2017
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA240,v 1.1 2017/10/17 08:42:30 bouyer Exp $
+
+From 41d579aad2fee971e5ce0279a9b559a0fdc74452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:46:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Disable PV linear pagetables by default
+
+Allowing pagetables to point to other pagetables of the same level
+(often called 'linear pagetables') has been included in Xen since its
+inception. But it is not used by the most common PV guests (Linux,
+NetBSD, minios), and has been the source of a number of subtle
+reference-counting bugs.
+
+Add a command-line option to control whether PV linear pagetables are
+allowed (disabled by default).
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh%google.com@localhost>
+Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+---
+Changes since v2:
+- s/_/-/; in command-line option
+- Added __read_mostly
+---
+ docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+index 54acc60723..ffa66eb146 100644
+--- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown.orig
++++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+@@ -1350,6 +1350,21 @@ The following resources are available:
+ CDP, one COS will corespond two CBMs other than one with CAT, due to the
+ sum of CBMs is fixed, that means actual `cos_max` in use will automatically
+ reduce to half when CDP is enabled.
++
++### pv-linear-pt
++> `= <boolean>`
++
++> Default: `true`
++
++Allow PV guests to have pagetable entries pointing to other pagetables
++of the same level (i.e., allowing L2 PTEs to point to other L2 pages).
++This technique is often called "linear pagetables", and is sometimes
++used to allow operating systems a simple way to consistently map the
++current process's pagetables into its own virtual address space.
++
++None of the most common PV operating systems (Linux, MiniOS)
++use this technique, but NetBSD in PV mode, and maybe custom operating
++systems which do.
+
+ ### reboot
+ > `= t[riple] | k[bd] | a[cpi] | p[ci] | P[ower] | e[fi] | n[o] [, [w]arm | [c]old]`
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+index 31d4a03840..5d125cff3a 100644
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