Subject: Re: RFC: securing output of /etc/security
To: Jason White <jdwhite@menelos.com>
From: Steven M. Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
List: netbsd-users
Date: 05/10/2006 11:23:49
On Wed, 10 May 2006 06:00:57 +0000 (UTC), Jason White
<jdwhite@menelos.com> wrote:
> On several occasions I've found that the output of /etc/security contains
> information that I do not wish to have mailed cleartext. I've modified
> /etc/daily to implement a scheme for PGP encrypting the daily insecurity
> output. Two new options in /etc/daily.conf enable this functionality:
>
> encrypt_security=YES
> SECURE_RECIPIENTS="jdwhite@menelos.com other@address.org"
>
> SECURE_RECIPIENTS is a space separated list of PGP/GPG recipient IDs. GPG is
> required for this to work. The root account's keyring must contain the keys
> defined by SECURE_RECIPIENTS. In addition, a program called 'mpack'
> (from converters/mpack) creates a MIME encoded message with the PGP encoded
> output as an attachment of type application/pgp and sends the message.
>
> I believe the reliance on mpack could be eliminated and replaced with a
> series of echo commands to a temp file with the appropriate MIME headers and
> boundary strings -- the whole thing eventually piped to 'sendmail -t', but
> it's less elegant then the mpack one-liner.
>
> I plan to file a PR eventually, but would appreciate feedback on this idea
> and/or its implementation.
The problem with this scheme is that it creates an (optional) dependency
in the base system on something in pkgsrc. Let me suggest an alternate
strategy: modify /etc/security to have some standard API to some arbitrary
other program. Then create a package -- which depends on gnupg and mpack
-- do do what you want.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb