On Dec 24,  2:45pm, elad@NetBSD.org (Elad Efrat) wrote:
-- Subject: Re: kern/35226: Problems with permissions in /usr/pkg/emul/linux/

|  >  that's a known issue that I already have a fix for. I'm not sure what
|  >  kind of semantics we want to have in procfs (ie., exclude cpuinfo from
|  >  the kauth check, or do that depending on uio_rw, or put it in the
|  >  secmodel) so I'm holding it for now.

Well, the code before was:


        /*
         * Do not allow init to be modified while in secure mode; it
         * could be duped into changing the security level.
         */
        if (uio->uio_rw == UIO_WRITE && p == initproc && securelevel > -1)
                return EPERM;


Which always allowed reads and forbad writes for init when securelevel > -1
This is not what the new code is doing is it, although the comment has remained
the same? I did not look at the procfs authorize code, but if it is doing
what the above if statement is doing, you should not need the case statement.

christos