On Jan 14,  8:57pm, Rui Paulo wrote:
} On 2005.08.24 17:39:34 +0000, John Nemeth wrote:
} | On Jan 14,  8:01pm, Rui Paulo wrote:
} | } On 2005.08.24 14:44:20 +0000, John Nemeth wrote:
} | } |      That would be a significantly more complex patch.  If I get time,
} | } | I may dig into login.c a little deeper and figure out how to do this.
} | } | However, I wonder if it is worth it, considering that this will soon be
} | } | legacy code?
} | }
} | } Why will it be soon "legacy code" ?
} |
} |      That might be a little strong.  However, consider that 3.0 will
} | most likely be out sometime this year.  3.0 onwards will use PAM which
} | does authentication completely differently.  Take a look in
} | src/usr.bin/login.  There you will see login.c and login_pam.c.
} | login.c handles tradational methods, i.e. 2.x and earlier (also, if you
} | do a custom build without PAM).  login_pam.c handles PAM, i.e. 3.0 and
} | onwards.
} 
} I see your point.
} 
} |      BTW, I see that you have a NetBSD.org address.  Could you commit
} | these patches?  Or, is monkeying with security related stuff too far
} | outside the areas that you normally work on?
} 
} Which patches? I still believe we need another way of handling this.
} login.conf is an idea; anyone else wants to comment on that ?

     I provided patches for both login.c and login_pam.c to stop login
from giving different messages for correct and incorrect passwords when
logging in as root on an insecure terminal.  Both patches are floating
around in this thread.

    Now that I think about it, I don't think login.conf should be
involved in any of this.  The secure flag in /etc/ttys determines if
one should be allowed to login as root on a given terminal.  Or, do you
want to use login.conf to dictate if a different message should be
displayed for the cases of correct and incorrect password?  I really
don't think this is necessary.

}-- End of excerpt from Rui Paulo