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On 2005.08.24 13:27:10 +0000, John Nemeth wrote:
| Anyways, here's a patch for 2.1:
|=20
| --- login.c.orig        2005-08-24 13:07:05.000000000 -0700
| +++ login.c     2005-08-24 13:08:30.000000000 -0700
| @@ -503,9 +503,7 @@
|                  * but with insecure terminal, refuse the login attempt.
|                  */
|                 if (pwd && !rval && rootlogin && !rootterm(tty)) {
| -                       (void)fprintf(stderr,
| -                           "%s login refused on this terminal.\n",
| -                           pwd->pw_name);
| +                       (void)printf("Login incorrect\n");
|                         if (hostname)
|                                 syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
|                                     "LOGIN %s REFUSED FROM %s ON TTY %s",
|=20
| I don't know whether this is considered to be a problem though, since
| it is consistent with traditional Unix behaviour.

I agree this is not a problem since it's mostly a traditional behaviour.
SunOSi, for example, doesn't even check for good/bad password (at least on
SunOS 5.9).
Your patch doesn't look wrong, but I would prefer if we could add a login.c=
onf
attribute to turn on/off this behaviour.

		-- Rui Paulo

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