Subject: Re: Chapter 8 security
To: Thor Lancelot Simon <email@example.com>
From: Daniel Carosone <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: 04/18/2004 20:26:48
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
On Sun, Apr 18, 2004 at 03:35:23AM -0400, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 18, 2004 at 01:55:27PM +0900, Curt Sampson wrote:
> > If you're go all the way with this, even that might not be good enough.
> > What is there to stop someone from making the password hash of a poor
> > pasword on another machine and using vipw to set it?
> Precisely that crypt(3) sees the *input* to the hash, and can enforce
> arbitrary restrictions on it.
As does login (etc) at the time the passwd is used, which is Curt's
point. I'm not entirely sure I like the idea, but the point is valid.
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