Subject: Re: BSD Authentication
To: None <current-users@NetBSD.org>
From: Peter Seebach <seebs@plethora.net>
List: current-users
Date: 09/08/2003 12:58:21
In message <20030908174745.DB9DE7B43@berkshire.research.att.com>, "Steven M. Be
llovin" writes:
>While in theory you're right, in practice it may not matter. If an
>auth module has an exploitable bug, I can probably use it to trick that
>auth module into saying "yes" whenever it's invoked. In many
>situations, that will let me have the privileges of any user on the
>systenm, which is exactly what 'root' is. (Remember when Unix systems
>shipped with a user "bin" who owned most of the files in /bin? It's
>gone now, for good and sufficient reason.)
I think that depends a lot on the auth module. The thing is, with PAM, your
exploit can basically override anything anywhere in memory. With BSD Auth,
you have a very narrow window of things you can send to the module, and the
default behavior is to listen only for a very small set of responses. So,
in most modules, there's no way to start authenticating as anything other
than root, and change to root - and there's not much for ways to pass data
to the authenticator. Still, it is a potential hole. TTBOMK, no one has
yet found any exploits for any of the BSD Auth code.
-s